


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**SOCIAL CHANGE ON MAINLAND
CHINA AND TAIWAN, 1949-80**

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UNIVERSITY
of
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**SOCIAL CHANGE ON MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN,
1949-1980**

*by Alan P.L. Liu**

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SOCIAL CHANGE ON MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN, 1949-1980

Alan P.L. Liu

I. INTRODUCTION

Ever since studies on Communist China acquired the informal status of an "independent discipline" in American academic community, scholarly attention has focused predominantly on three aspects of mainland Chinese development: foreign affairs, economic growth and the ideology and organization of the Communist Party. With few exceptions, very little study has been done on the social change of mainland China. Of the few books on Chinese society, several are of dubious scholarly value since they serve largely as the mouthpiece of the propagandists of the Communist Party.¹

It is not my purpose here to discuss the reasons for the "slant" in Chinese studies in America though some reasons are obvious, including the preference of grant agencies, public or private, for studies that have immediate relevance to American foreign policy and the ideological stands of many "China specialists" in the United States.

The same reasons of realpolitik and ideological preferences of American scholars account for the existence of only a handful of studies in America on Taiwan. Due to the default of American "China specialists", social and economic change on Taiwan since 1949 has been occasionally commented upon by American journalists and economists interested in the development of the Third World.²

Recently, however, American specialists on China have shown more interest than in the past on the social change on Taiwan and mainland China. There are three possible reasons for this. First, social unrest on mainland China has, so to speak, pressed its face against American scholars, beginning with the riot in Tiananmen Square in Peking in April 1976, the wall posters and protests in Peking and the candid admissions by high-ranking Chinese Communist officials on the "crisis of confidence and faith" in Socialism among the young on mainland China in 1978-1979. Second, as a

1. Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," *The New York Review of Books*, 1979, XXVI (5), pp. 33-40.

2. Fei, John C.H., Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, *Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

result of numerous revelations on the state of the Chinese economy and society by mainland Chinese press after 1978, the image of "social life in the PRC (being) relatively orderly and free of crime and corruption"³—a view prevalent among young "China specialists" in America—is no longer tenable. Against the chaos, disillusionment and poverty on mainland China, social change on Taiwan, so succinctly expressed in the book title "Growth with Equity",⁴ is impressive. Third, after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and mainland China, the Chinese Communist Party has mounted a widely publicized campaign for Taiwan's "reunification" with mainland China. Consequently a number of "China specialists" have turned their attention to the compatibility of the two societies separated by Taiwan Strait.

The stand of this paper is that a comparative study of social change on Taiwan and the mainland, quite apart from its possible political implication, has intrinsic value. Broadly speaking, such a comparative study will shed light on the questions: just what does a radical revolution typically accomplish or fail to accomplish? More specifically, a comparative analysis of social change on Taiwan and mainland China tests the relative efficacy of different approaches to social change that is of concern to many leaders in the Third World.

II. TWO ROADS

(1) *Strategy*

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the phrase "struggle between two lines or two roads" disappeared from Chinese Communist lexicon. However as one reviews thirty years of social change on mainland China and Taiwan, the dichotomy of "two roads" of development comes readily to mind, albeit not in the sense that Mao used the phrase. For this paper, the term "two roads" of development refers to the two main approaches to social change that have been the focus of several American sociologists.

Daniel Bell, in discussing post-Stalin changes in Russia, made use of William Graham Sumner's concepts of "crescive" and "enacted" changes. According to Bell,

Crescive changes are those which surge, swell, go on willy-nilly, and develop with some measure of autonomy. They variously derive from organic growth of tradition, or from

3. Townsend, James R., *Politics in China* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p. 323.

4. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, *Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case*.

changes in values (e.g., the decision of people to have fewer children or more), or from technical imperatives, once a key decision has been taken (e.g., the need for training more engineers, once a country industrializes).

Enacted changes are the conscious decisions or intents of legislators or rulers (e.g., the declaration of war, the collectivization of agriculture, the location of new industry, etc.). Those who enact change have to take into account the mores of the people and the resources at their disposal, but these serve only as limiting, not determining, factors.⁵

In reality, social changes often are partly "crescive" and partly "enacted." Societies differ according to the relative proportion of these two types of change. It is clear that mainland China has had much more "enacted" changes than Taiwan. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party has made an enemy of the traditional "mores of the people." The changes on Taiwan in the past three decades have been more "crescive" than "enacted" and the Nationalist leaders have "coopted" the traditional mores of Chinese people to facilitate social development.

Parallel to Bell *cum* Sumner, the late Daniel Lerner, in discussing the relationship between mass media and modernization in the Middle East, spoke of two models of social change: a Western model of modernization as a "historical process" and revision of the Western model by a "new stochastic factor." Lerner stated that,

. . . the Western model of modernization exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global. Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has "gone with" wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting). The model evolved in the West is a historical fact . . . the same basic model reappears in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed. . . .⁶

The Western model, however, has been interfered with by a "stochastic factor," i.e., new governments around the world introducing or imposing instant symbols of modernity in a predominantly

5. Bell, Daniel, *The End of Ideology*. (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 328.

6. Lerner, Daniel, *The Passing of Traditional Society*. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 46.

traditional society such as a superhighway in Ghana or a wired loud-speaker system in the countryside of mainland China. These instant symbols of modernity are induced by the nationalistic leaders of new nations in disregard of "the basic arrangement of lifeways out of which slowly evolved those modern institutions now so hastily symbolized," Lerner continued:

A stochastic factor may be a genuine innovation which will remake the model; or it may be a risk taken in ignorance of the model. The evidence now available suggests that, in the Middle East, we are usually dealing with the latter alternative.⁷

The evidence now coming out of mainland China after the death of Mao Zedong shows unmistakably that the "Maoist model" of development also belongs to Lerner's "latter alternative." On the whole, the Nationalist government on Taiwan has followed the Western model of historical process, even while resorting to some "enacted changes."

Modernization accentuates the problems of coordination, interdependence, centralization and decentralization. In scholarly discussions of these problems we find once more a "two roads" approach. Marion Levy, Jr., for example, emphasized centralization. Charles Frank, however, stressed decentralization as he maintained that:

Increasing interdependence means that the rules of the game under which individual decision-makers operate must be modified, mainly in the direction of imposing increasing restraints on individual and group behavior. But there are good rules and bad rules—good rules allow for a large degree of individual and subgroup autonomy while taking into account interdependencies in an efficient fashion . . . a decentralized procedure, making use of the signals that are available through the price mechanism, is measurably more efficient than system of centralized decision-making and control.⁸

Levy, however, clearly recognized the limits to centralization and the impact of "stochastic factors" in modernization. For example, modernization typically results in a positive association between distribution of income, prestige and power. But Levy noted:

7. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

8. Levy, Jr., Marion, *Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors*. (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 73-74.

Only factor increases this association between income, power, and prestige more radically than the *increase* of modernization itself: the attempts to carry the level of explicit social planning of income distribution and other social allocations beyond the level of centralization required by the level of modernization so far achieved.⁹

A sharp contrast between Taiwan and mainland China concerning centralization or decentralization occurred in 1953. When the Chinese Communists on the mainland declared "transition to Socialism" and started the process of unprecedented centralization in that year, the Nationalists on Taiwan began transferring several public enterprises under their control to private ownership.¹⁰

In the same year, while Taiwan marked the completion of its "Land to the Tiller" program in which 48 percent of farm families received land, the Communist Party on mainland China began the first step of collectivization of land by inducing peasants to form permanent "mutual aid teams." One result of decentralization on Taiwan has been the growth of a dynamic private sector that is chiefly responsible for Taiwan's high rate of economic growth. The excessive centralization on mainland China has created a politico-economic system with, in the words of Zhao Ziyang, "intolerably low efficiency".¹¹

(2) *Tactics*

The two fundamentally different approaches to change that have been discussed so far constitute the most generalized determinant of socio-economic development. A generalized determinant must, however, be translated into more specific and focalized norms which, in turn, govern discrete programs in socio-economic realm. In other words, strategy must be combined with tactics in social engineering as in battle.

On mainland China, many of the present social problems such as the "crisis of faith in Socialism," the low efficiency in production, the demoralization of workers and youth, the rise in juvenile crimes, youth unemployment, political corruption and poverty could be accounted for largely by the specific norms that governed Chinese

9. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

10. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, *Growth With Equity: The Taiwan Case*, p. 52.

11. Zhao, Ziyang, "The Present Economic Situation and the Principles for Future Economic Construction," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (51), pp. 6-36.

Communist policies in economics, social relation and political leadership.

The economic development of mainland China had been dictated by three norms: (1) "High targets, high accumulation, low efficiency and low consumption" (*gao zhibiao, gao jilei, dixiaoguo* and *dixiaofei*), (2) "Production first, livelihood second" (*xien shengchan, hou shenghuo*), and (3) "Heavy industry first, light industry second and agriculture third" (*zhong, qing* and *nong*). It is this set of norms that have made the most conspicuous and deepest mark on Chinese society today: a sharp contrast between urban and rural areas on almost every aspect of socio-economic life on the Chinese mainland. In subsequent sections of this essay we shall be specific on the contrasts, e.g., in education, social mobility, standard of living, etc. It is sufficient for my present purpose to point out that the urban-rural difference runs like a red thread throughout mainland Chinese society. The root of this divergence lies in the very first Five-year Plan of 1953-57 and it fully bloomed during the Great Leap Forward years of 1958-1960. According to the late Alexander Eckstein, the economic program of the Great Leap,

envisaged that the whole economy might be divided into two broad sectors, one modern and one traditional. The modern sector would be preponderantly characterized by more capital-intensive and large-scale methods of production, while the traditional sector would be dominated by more labor-intensive and small-scale methods. At the same time, each sector would be more or less self-sufficient every attempt would be made to minimize the leakages from the modern sector to the traditional sector,¹²

Chinese Communist leaders now repeatedly admit that, notwithstanding the proclamation of "Agriculture First" policy after the debacle of the Great Leap, no fundamental change was made on the basic strategy of dividing Chinese society into two mutually self-sufficient sectors until the death of Mao in 1976. It is ironic that so intensely nationalistic a leader like Mao nevertheless perpetrated on mainland China a colonial model of a dual economy and society.

With regard to the social relation on mainland China, the norm of "class struggle" has had a tremendous impact. In addition, the continuous shifts and turns in the policy of the Communist Party with regard to authority pattern in society (e.g., between students

12. Eckstein, Alexander, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 57.

and teachers, workers and managerial personnel, peasants and cadres, etc.) have made an indelible mark on the psychology of mainland Chinese. On this, the practice of Chinese Communists and Mao was a contrast to Russia under Stalin. According to Alex Inkeles, from the early 1930s, Stalin implemented a whole series of programs intended to stabilize social relationships. Specifically, "progressive" education was abandoned and a conventional education system was restored. A legal system was established. A refined and elaborate system of social stratification was restituted. Finally, Stalin's regime came to terms with the church. These seemingly conventional norms sanctioned by Stalin were not intended to restore tradition but to use the latter "to serve the radical end of remaking Soviet man in a new mold of subservience".¹³ Stalin had perceived the usefulness of conventional social relations in generating a high rate of economic growth and industrialization which demands a hierarchical authority, technical competence, labor discipline and the integration of complex tasks. In retrospect, in 1956 a number of Chinese Communist leaders tried to replicate what Stalin did in the 1930s. But in less than two years, Mao Zedong had overturned the efforts of other leaders to stabilize the social relationships on mainland China. Thereafter, Mao Zedong subjected mainland Chinese society to increasing turmoils which reached a peak in the Cultural Revolution. The social mores of the people on mainland China today bear witness to the deleterious effect of Mao's preference for destabilization of social relationships.

Aside from the impact of a dual economy and Mao's preference for class struggle, social change on mainland China has also been greatly affected by "political decay" which refers to sharpened divisions among the elite, instability and disintegration of institution, a rise in political corruption and the ascendancy of military men in civilian politics. A review of the history of Communist rule on mainland China makes it clear that political decay set in after the Great Leap Forward and culminated in the Cultural Revolution. Among the social effects of political decay are lack of credibility of the government among the populace, factionalism, corruption among Party cadres, and a high degree of "immobilism" in society.

In contrast to the lopsided development on mainland China, economic development on Taiwan began with an integrated and balanced emphasis on agriculture and industry. Before the Nationalists

13. Inkeles, Alex, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 21.

started the first Four-year Plan of industrial development in 1953, a land reform was carried out and the government made sufficient investment in the construction of rural infrastructure. As a result, the income of tenant farmers rose 81 percent between 1949 and 1952.¹⁴ Furthermore, the first Four-year Plan on Taiwan did not emphasize capital-intensive heavy industry. On the contrary, light industries that are closely linked with agriculture such as fertilizer, textile, sugar and food processing, were the main programs of development.¹⁵ These industries, by being labor-intensive and utilizing local materials, were able to provide employment for underemployed farmers, thus relieving the problem of serious overpopulation in Taiwan's countryside in the 1950s. Moreover, the distribution of industrial establishments throughout 1951-71 did not become concentrated in any one area. "This spatially dispersed growth pattern enabled farm families almost anywhere in Taiwan to move easily into rural industries that were intensive in labor".¹⁶ Consequently, the sharp urban-rural division evident on mainland China did not emerge on Taiwan.

Socially, the Chinese Nationalist government took to Taiwan its preference of upholding traditional or Confucian ethos to insure stability in social relationship amidst rapid economic development. This policy had not worked on the mainland before 1949 and the Nationalist authority had been much derided by some Western scholars who were more attracted by the radical populism of Chinese Communist Party. Yet the Meiji reformers in Japan had shown earlier that Confucian ethos and conventional social relationships are compatible with economic development, given the right domestic and international conditions. Mainland China before 1949, ravaged by anarchy, warlordism, civil war and Japanese aggression, did not provide the Kuomintang with the right conditions for reformism. But once removed from the chaos on the mainland, the Nationalist government on Taiwan enjoyed domestic peace and international security. Under those conditions the tactics of combining conventional social ethics with economic development proved to be efficacious.

Taiwan's steady and real socio-economic change in the past 30 years was further facilitated by political stability. The Kuomintang

14. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, *Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case*, p. 40.

15. Wei, Yung-ning, "Industry and Commerce for the Past 30 Years." *Tai Wan Kuan-fu San-shih Nien* (Thirty Years After the Restoration of Taiwan), Volume 2 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Provincial Government, 1975), p. 243.

16. Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, *Growth with Equity: TTC*, p. 63.

has been able to avoid the "blood purge" that almost destroyed the Chinese Communists. But the "political stability" on Taiwan was based, for a long time, on traditional Chinese authoritarianism. Apparently Chinese Nationalist leaders, having learned from their defeat on the mainland, had decided on the tradeoff between political participation and economic participation (per capita income). By satisfying the latter, the Kuomintang warded off the former for some time. But the usefulness of these tactics is being rapidly exhausted. So, in the 1970s, Nationalist leaders began a series of policy changes designed to increase political participation. In this as in other undertakings, the motto of the Nationalists on Taiwan has been gradualism and incrementalism, in contrast to the drastic swings of Chinese Communist politics on the mainland. It is revealing that gradualism and incrementalism are the professed mottos of the present leaders on the Chinese mainland.

We have, by now, analyzed and contrasted the most fundamental differences between mainland China and Taiwan in their approach to social change and the specific norms or tactics that governed the socio-economic programs carried in the two societies. Descending further from general concepts, we shall proceed to describe specific areas of social change on Taiwan and mainland China. They are: occupational composition, education, social stratification and social mobility, the status of women, public health, the media of communication, and, finally, social consensus and integration.

III. SOCIAL CHANGE

(1) *Occupation and Population*

The degree of a society's change toward modernity is often measured by the change in its occupational composition. C.E. Black and Alex Inkeles, for example, both suggested that the most important indication of a society's being transformed from traditional to modern is the transfer of more than one-half of the work force of a society from agriculture to manufacturing, transportation, commerce, and services.¹⁷

When we turn to the occupational structure of mainland China, we are immediately faced with a stark reality: 80 percent of mainland Chinese population are still engaging in agriculture, i.e., producing food. A revealing admission was made by a "Special

17. Black, C.E., *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 78; Inkeles, Alex. *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, p. 139.

Commentator" (pseudonym for a high rank Communist Party official) of the *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) on April 9, 1981:

Our nation has one billion people and 800 million are peasants. What does this signify? Wherein lies our difficulty?

Both the number and composition of our population indicate the backwardness of our economy and the low standard of our production. That 800 million peasants are preoccupied with raising food shows that the peasants still labor with their hands, productivity being low and that the broad countryside remains at semi-self sufficiency state.¹⁸

The paradox of mainland Chinese society is that the large percentage of agrarian workers existed amidst a tremendous growth in industry from 1949 to 1978. In this 30-year period, Chinese Communist heavy industry had grown by 90.5 times, light industry by 19.7 times and agriculture by 2.4 times!¹⁹ Consequently, the percentage of industrial output in the total industrial-agricultural output on mainland China rose from 30 percent in 1949 to 74 percent in 1978.²⁰ This paradoxical fact can only mean, as suggested by Eberstadt and the late Alexander Eckstein, that there has been an increasing divergence between agricultural and industrial product per worker.²¹

In other words, a dual economy and society exist on mainland China and the gaps between the rural and urban society on mainland China have been widening over the years. Urgent appeals by post-Mao leaders to urban factories to "link up" with villagers bear out this point.

Another indication of the lopsided nature of the socio-economic development on mainland China is the extremely low number of mainland workers in tertiary industry. In most mature industrial nations, an average of 30 or more percent of the labor force are in the tertiary sector. On mainland China, as reported in 1978, only 6.4 percent of the labor force was in "tertiary industry".²²

18. *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), April 9, 1981, p. 5.

19. Soong, Jiwen. "On Greatly Increasing the Production of Consumer Goods," *Hongqi* (Red Flag), 1981 (6), 8-12.

20. "Our Nation Has Constructed A Relatively Comprehensive Industrial System," *Renmin Ribao*, October 2, 1979, p. 1.

21. Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," XXVI (5), pp. 39-40; Eckstein, Alex, *China's Economic Revolution*, p. 231.

22. Wang, Yinwei. "The Key to the Control of Our Nation's Population Growth Lies in the Countryside," *Renmin Ribao*, May 8, 1981, p. 5.

The evidence thus suggests that mainland China not only remains traditional but also that its society and economy resembles strongly a colonial structure of a modern, urban and industrial enclave coexisting with a large, rural and primitive society.

The occupational composition on Taiwan, on the other hand, shows unmistakably that Taiwan has crossed the threshold from tradition to modernity. The proportions of the labor force on Taiwan in 1947 and 1975 bear this out (Table 1). Accompanying the changing occupational structure on Taiwan is the rise in urban population. In 1956, 27 percent of Taiwan's population resided in localities of 100,000 or more inhabitants and by 1977 the percentage increased to 45.²³

Table 1: Labor Force By Type of Industry on Taiwan
(Percentage)

Industry	Year	
	1947	1975
I. Primary (Agriculture, forestry, fishery, animal husbandry)	67.5	29.9
II. Secondary (Manufacturing, Mining)	6.9	35.5
III. Tertiary (Commerce, transport, service)	25.6	34.6

Source: Lin, Jui-teh. "Problems and Possible Solutions on the Quality of Taiwan's Population" in Kuo-chu Yang and Ch'i-cheng Yeh, ed., *Tang Chien Tai Wan Shih-hui Wen Tai* (Current Social Problems on Taiwan). Taipei: Chu-liu Publishing Company, 1979, p. 178.

Urban conglomeration also occurred on Taiwan. For example, 31 percent of the population increase on Taiwan from 1951 to 1976 happened in the capital city of Taipei and the larger Taipei County.²⁴

The urban population of mainland China had also grown substantially. In fact, a 100 percent increase in urban population occurred on the mainland from 1949 to 1978, i.e., from some 50 million to 110 million. The number of cities with a million population in-

23. *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1978* (Taipei; Director General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1978), p. 12.

24. Lin, Yi-hou. "The Concentration of Taiwan's Population and Its Effect," In Yang, Kuo-chu and Yeh, Ch'i-cheng, ed., *Tang Chien Tai Wan Shih Hui Wen Ti* (The Current Social Problems in Taiwan), (Taipei: Chu-liu Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 156-157.

creased from five in the early 1950s to more than 20 in 1978.²⁵

In the growth of urban population on Taiwan and mainland China one also sees a contrast. The pattern of growth on Taiwan follows what Daniel Lerner called the Western model of "historical process" whereas the pattern of mainland China is influenced by a "stochastic factor." As part of the Great Leap Forward, from 1958 to 1960, the Chinese Communist government had induced 19 million rural workers into cities as the number of industrial establishments in 1960 alone had increased by 65.5 percent. The urban population on mainland China suddenly increased from 99 million in 1957 to 130 million in 1960! In the meantime due to the dislocation of the Great Leap, food production had declined by 26.4 percent in the same period.²⁶ Food shortage and famine made the Communists to repatriate some 28 million urban residents to the countryside in 1961-62.²⁷

In the urban-rural population distribution on mainland China, we find a paradox similar to the one that we see in the industrial-agricultural occupational composition. That is, there was a growth in urban population without a diminution of rural population. Two plausible factors account for this: high fertility rate in the countryside and the Chinese Communist policy of restricting peasant movement into cities (with the exceptional period of 1958-60). Moreover, after 1960, millions of urban youth had been settled by force in the countryside. The fact that fertility in the countryside remained high, according to Eberstadt, indicated that rural socio-economic conditions on the mainland have improved but little. Eberstadt wrote:

In death and birth rates lie clues about the state of health, and perhaps even of social development, in China. The death rate, after all, reflects life expectancy, and life expectancy is the single best index of national health. The birth rate, which at first glance may not seem to indicate much about social well-being, carried meaning of its own as well. Birth rates depend on family size, and for most of man's history high birth rates and large families have been the rule. There was (and in many parts of the world, still is) logic behind this: in a world of poverty, parents are

25. Zhang, Qignwu, "Control the Growth of Urban Population," *Renmin Ribao*, August 21, 1979, p. 3.

26. *Ibid.*

27. "Adjustment, Consolidation, Strengthening, Enhancement," *Renmin Ribao*, July 14, 1981, p. 5.

desperately dependent on their children for their own survival A significant drop in the birth rate means, among other things, that parents are no longer driven by the need for children and their labor which characterizes hand-to-mouth existence²⁸

After noting the fact that the Chinese Communists have had more success in fertility control in the cities than in the countryside, Eberstadt stated: "the discrepancy in family size probably reflects markedly different standards of comfort in city and country".²⁹ Recent revelations in the mainland Chinese press on the growth of rural population corroborate Eberstadt's observation.³⁰ Once more, we see evidence of a dual society on mainland China.

(2) *Education*

Next to the transformation of occupation from agriculture to industry, growth in education and literacy is a significant measure of the degree of modernization of a society. "Formal education," said James Coleman, "has a cardinal role in producing the bureaucratic, managerial, technical, and professional cadres required for modernization" and "education is unquestionably the master determinant in the realization of equality in a modernizing society dominated by achievement and universalist norms".³¹ On mainland China and Taiwan, the development of education has been significantly affected by the norms that determine the overall socio-economic change in the two societies.

The growth of the educational system on mainland China, for example, has been stunted by the Communist Party's (especially Mao's) use of the nation's resources primarily for heavy industry at the expense of other socio-economic development.³² Whereas, after 1959, the state on mainland China increased its investment in new industry by several folds, expenditure in education steadily de-

28. Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," XXVI (5), p. 33.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

30. Wang, Yinwei, "The Key to the Control of Our Nation's Population Growth Lies in the Countryside," p. 5.

31. Coleman, James S., "Introduction: Education and Political Development," in James S. Coleman, ed., *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 17.

32. Jiang, Nanqiang and Ch'engxien, Zhang, "Overcome the Effect of leftism. Do Well in Education Adjustment," *Hongqi*, 1981 (3), pp. 26-29.

clined.³³ In 1975, only 6.3 percent of the total state expenditure was on education and in terms of state expense on education per person mainland China ranked the 141st in the world.³⁴ Even in 1979, the state budget on mainland China allocated only \$8.14 per person for education, health, science and culture.³⁵ It is no wonder that the educational composition of mainland China is less than impressive. In August 1981, the *Bulletin of Liaoning University* reported that in the entire mainland China, 0.5 percent of the population have had an equivalent of college education, 22 percent middle school education, 62.5 percent primary school education and 15 percent illiterate. Every year an increment of 25 million illiterates is anticipated.³⁶ Officially the rate of primary school attendance on mainland China is 93 percent, but actually only 30 percent of school children completed the full six-year term.³⁷ Furthermore, most of the illiterates are still in the countryside. While conducting the first direct county election for members of County People's Congress in 1980, Chinese officials discovered that the number of illiterates in rural areas was large and that in some areas (*not* located in the frontiers or marginal areas of the nation) illiteracy had reached 70 percent!³⁸ In 1981 as new agricultural policy of post-Mao leaders which granted rural areas a large degree of autonomy in economic decision-making took hold, many peasants refused to support local schools financially.³⁹ Apparently, due to the lack of fundamental change in the socio-economic conditions in the countryside on mainland China, peasants saw little or no need to invest in education.

The Chinese Communist Party's order of preference of heavy industry—light industry—agriculture has also been institutionalized in the educational system on mainland China. From 1949 to 1978, the state assigned most and the best high school and college graduates first to defense industry, then to heavy industry, and third, to

33. Li, Hai and Xu, Yapin, "Educational Growth Must Be Kept Up with Growth in Economic Construction," *Renmin Ribao*, April 19, 1980, p. 3.

34. Ting, Wang, "Official Revelation from Peking: The Total Number of Illiterates Is 150 Million," *Ming Pao Daily News*, August 12, 1981, p. 3.

35. "China Acts to Slow Its Rate of Growth," *The New York Times*, July 5, 1979.

36. Ting, W., "Official Revelation from Peking: The Total Number of Illiterates Is 150 Million," p. 3.

37. Li, H. and Xu, Y., "Educational Growth Must Be Kept Up with Growth in Economic Construction," p. 3.

38. Lu, Shuxian, "Problems Concerning 'The Majority' in Our Educational Work," *Renmin Ribao*, July 10, 1980, p. 3.

39. "New Problems and New Measures in Rural Schools," *Renmin Ribao*, August 27, 1981, p. 3.

light industry.⁴⁰ The agricultural sector was slighted throughout the 30-year history of the People's Republic. Before 1966, only seven percent of the students in higher learning were in special agricultural institutes. In 1979, that percentage had declined to 4.4.⁴¹ We thus add even more evidence to the existence of dual, rural-urban, society on mainland China.

Perhaps most pernicious of all, with regard to the educational system on mainland China, is the alarming deterioration in the quality of education after 1958. Largely due to Mao's hostility toward "intellectual elitism", Chinese schools, particularly colleges and universities, were not permitted to operate normally after 1959 and were suspended in 1966-1970. After 1978, the mainland Chinese press has published numerous "horror stories" about the low quality of students. A professor of Chinese language reported of a test of 94 juniors at a normal college in 1981 in which he found that 84 to 97 percent of the students did not know the most elementary method of locating source materials, such as making use of the "Guide to Periodical Literature", to do research.⁴² Semi-literate "college graduates" abound in post-Mao China.⁴³

After the death of Mao, many Western journalists and businessmen reported, after visits to mainland China, that the morale and efficiency of Chinese workers are very low. The reasons for that are not difficult to find. The mainland State Statistical Bureau reported in October, 1980, that of the "staff and workers" in 26 Chinese provinces, cities and autonomous regions (i.e., practically the whole nation): 40.8 percent had the equivalent of less than a junior high school education, 15.9 percent, a high school education and 3.1 percent, a higher education. In tests administered in some factories, more than 60 percent of employees and workers with junior and high school education failed.⁴⁴ In the city of Harbin, center of steel and munition industry on mainland China, an investigation in 1979 showed that 87 percent of factory workers had less than a junior high

40. "The Adjustment of Scientific and Technical Personnel Is A Must," *Renmin Ribao*, May 24, 1981, p. 3.

41. "Give 'Nutrition' to Agricultural Institutes," *Renmin Ribao*, December 20, 1980, p. 4.

42. Pan, Xuguan, "It is Necessary for Colleges to Offer Courses on Locating Source Materials," *Renmin Ribao*, August 25, 1981, p. 3.

43. Xia, Yen, "A Letter to A Young Man," *Renmin Ribao*, November 5, 1979, p. 3.

44. Li. Ch'enrui, "Adjust the Production and Construction Front. Strengthen the Education Front," *Renmin Ribao*, October 9, 1980, p. 3.

school education.⁴⁵

In a very few selected areas, however, Chinese Communist advance in science and technology astounded American visitors, e.g., space, rocketry and aviation. After a visit to Chinese space facilities in 1979, the American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics reported:

In many cases our preconceived notions based on briefings and reports given by earlier U.S. delegations proved misleading. We were quite surprised at the advanced state of development in several technological areas as shown by work conducted in the last two or three years.

Certain solid-state devices and techniques appeared to be advancing apace with those in the U.S. Certainly we would discount any sweeping observation that "Chinese technology is x years behind the U.S."⁴⁶

The huge gap in education and technology between the few defense-related industries and the primitive conditions in the vast countryside and urban conglomerates on mainland China reminds one of traditional China. Then the cultural sophistication of the royal court and scholar-officials often dazzled a few European visitors like Marco Polo, though the overwhelming majority of Chinese population lived in primitive conditions.

As on mainland China, the educational development on Taiwan has been determined largely by the specific norms of socio-economic programs of Nationalist Chinese government, e.g., accent on social stability and training of technical specialists to support Taiwan's economic development. The remarkable achievement of Taiwan's education is well-known to scholars and journalists interested in Asia so there is little need to dwell at length here. In 1981, the school attendance rate at the primary schools on Taiwan is 99 percent and 90 percent at junior high schools. More than one out of two youths between the ages of fifteen and seventeen attended high school. Twenty-two percent of adolescents (between ages eighteen and twenty-one) attended colleges or universities. Economic growth and education complement each other. In 1967, the ratio of students in higher vocational schools to general middle schools was 4:6 but in

45. "An Important Path to the Enhancement of the Scientific & Cultural Standard of Employees and Workers," *Renmin Ribao*, September 20, 1979, p. 3.

46. Edelson, Burton; Haas, Sheldon; Harford, James; Jaffe, Leonard; Nansen, Ralph; Schnapf, Abraham and Yarmovych, Michael. "Eyewitness Report on Chinese Satellite Work," *Astronautics & Aeronautics*, 1980 (February), pp. 38-44.

1977, the ratio had changed to 6:4 as planned by Taiwan specialists on manpower development.⁴⁷

On mainland China, there has been a gross imbalance between students in general middle schools and those in vocational schools, the ratio being 32:1.⁴⁸ Moreover, the enrollments in the vocational schools in Taiwan reflect Taiwan's economic growth. In 1956, 24.19 percent of students in vocational schools were in agricultural schools; the percentage declined to 8.18 in 1972. Correspondingly, the percentage of students in industrial schools rose from 20.45 in 1956 to 45.63 in 1972.⁴⁹

Thus a comparison of the educational development on Taiwan and mainland China confirm the overall contrasting trend in the two societies: whereas Taiwan shows steady and balanced growth and gains, mainland China's development is marked by initial gain followed by decline, imbalance and even disintegration. Our analysis in the educational development in Taiwan and mainland China brings out a further contrast: the educational system on the mainland was extremely vulnerable to the effect of personal idiosyncracies of political leaders. Taiwan's educational system does not have these characteristics. According to Talcott Parsons, as societies advance from primitive to modern, "they tend to become decreasingly subject to major change from narrow, particularized, conditional causes operating through specific physical circumstances or individual organic or personality differences".⁵⁰ The ill fate of the mainland Chinese educational system, especially higher education, was largely the responsibility of Mao Tse-tung, who had had a deep antipathy toward university learning (with the exception of defense-related subjects). As mainland Chinese scholars eloquently testified after the death of Mao, "feudalism" was still predominant in mainland Chinese politics, economics and society.

(3) *Social Stratification and Mobility*

Modernization everywhere tends to promote social equity in the long run. According to Alex Inkeles, modernization brings forth

47. Wang, Tze-ting, "Middle and Vocational School Education for the Past 30 years," *Tai Wan Kuan-fu San-shih Nien*, Volume 4 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Provincial Government), 1975, p. 79.

48. Duan, Wuyon, "We Must Break Shackles In Order to Change the Composition of Middle School Education," *Renmin Ribao*, July 8, 1980, p. 3.

49. Wang, "Middle and Vocational School Education for the Past 30 Years," p. 78.

50. Parsons, Talcott, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 10.

social homogenization and equilibration within the stratification system. By the former, Inkeles meant "reducing the gap or range separating the top and the bottom of the scale in the several stratification subsystems based on income, status, power, experience (self expression, knowledge, and skill) . . ." ⁵¹

By equilibration, Inkeles referred to the phenomenon that "an individual's rank in any one of the several stratification hierarchies tends to be the same or similar to his rank in any other hierarchy of the set." ⁵² Let us look into these two aspects of social change on mainland China and Taiwan.

Revolutionaries since the French Revolution have invariably promised "equality" to their constituents, though the evidence from world history shows that revolutionaries typically replace the old stratification with a new one. The Chinese Communist Party is no exception. Despite contrary claims by Chinese Communist propagandists and some of their sympathizers in the West, mainland China is still a highly stratified society. Interviews with former residents of mainland China and other evidence shows that social stratification on mainland China closely resembles the stratification in the Soviet Union. Generally speaking there are eleven major social-class groups on mainland China:

1. The ruling elite, a small group consisting of high Party, government, economic, and military officials, prominent scientists (the majority being in defense industries), and selected artists and writers;
2. Senior cadres, composed of the intermediary ranks of the categories mentioned above, plus certain important technical specialists such as senior engineers or architects;
3. Middle cadres, incorporating most of the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, junior military officers, technicians, most professionals and some skilled workers;
4. The working class "aristocracy", consisting of those working in sophisticated industries such as instrumentation, computer, semiconductor, and defense industries such as space, missiles and aviation;
5. General white-collar group, encompassing most employees, and lower Party cadres;
6. Average workers, e.g., in steel industry, textile, etc.;

51. Inkeles, Alex, *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, p. 138.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

7. Lower workers, those working in sanitation, sales and restaurants;

8. Peasants in well-to-do villages, most in the areas surrounding modern cities like Shanghai;

9. Disadvantaged workers, i.e., "contracted workers" who are not unionized and whose employment is seasonal; perhaps the youth sent to settle in the countryside should also be included in this class;

10. Average peasants;

11. Five groups of outcasts; former landlords, rich peasants, "counter-revolutionaries," "bad elements," and "rightists."

There are other important features of the social stratification on mainland China that are not entirely clear from the above hierarchy. The first is that, to most Chinese youth on the mainland, the higher Party-government-military elite is regarded as a "caste", closed to all outsiders. The successors to this triumvirate elite are their children. Second, as compared with 1949, the one social group that gained significantly in status over the decades was the military. A young Chinese, if he is of the "correct" family background, would choose the military as his second career preference, the first being always a college education in science or engineering. A military background gives a mainland Chinese a marked advantage over others in gaining access later to university education, Party membership and a preferred position in industry. Third, the gain of the military on mainland China is contrasted with the loss of status of teachers and intellectuals. In traditional China, teachers were esteemed. Now after thirty years of Mao's campaigns against "intellectual elitism," teachers have become an unenviable group in China. Two instances suffice to show the low status of teachers on mainland China toward the end of Mao's era. It was reported in 1978 that while the radicals were in control of Qinghua (T'singhua) University, three thousand professors and staff were sent deliberately to an area then infested with contagious diseases; as a result, more than a thousand of them fell victims to the diseases.⁵³ In 1975, the melon field outside of Peking produced a bumper crop. There was a momentary shortage of melon salesmen. So, a cadre in charge of state commerce made a phone call to nearby schools, commanding teachers to help sell melons. "Teachers are saboteurs of Socialism" rationalized the cadre, "so it is better to make them create some real value to compensate

53. "Qinghua University Expose Gang of Gour and Made Great Advance," *Renmin Ribao*, February 5, 1978, p. 1.

Socialism".⁵⁴ There have been frequent reports in mainland Chinese press of beatings of teachers by cadres and their relatives. Finally, and most revealing about the social stratification on mainland China, is the low status of peasants. Despite all the official proclamations about the peasants' being "the purist" or "cleanest" people on earth, every mainland Chinese, except the mentally retarded, can see that peasants are shabbily treated and are only one step higher in status than the outcasts ("five elements"). Mainland Chinese press frequently refers to the "*qing nong*" (looking down on peasants) attitude among the public.⁵⁵ The lack of recognition of peasants in Chinese Communist society was demonstrated in the speeches and representations of the Fifth National People's Congress in September 1980. The official *People's Daily* had unprecedentedly devoted page after page to the views expressed by the delegates at the Congress. Of all the delegates, only two from Hubei aired the views of peasants. Subsequently, several readers wrote to the paper with the query: "Why are there so few who speak on behalf of peasants?"⁵⁶

A few words need also be said about the formal "outcast" on mainland China. Even before gaining control of mainland China, Mao Tse-tung had made his intention known to create a class of outcast—non-people—under his "People's Democratic Dictatorship." Mao kept his promise after 1949. At first, "non-people" included only landlords and "bureaucrat-capitalists," but, as years went by, other groups were added and new labels were invented such as "rich peasants," "counterrevolutionaries," "rightists," "bad elements," and, most recently, "new-born bourgeoisie." Based on a recent official report, there were, in 1977, six million former landlords, rich peasants, "counterrevolutionaries," and "bad elements" in Communist China. After Deng Xiaoping's "de-classification" campaign of 1979, the number of the above "five elements" had been reduced to 100,000. In 1948, the Communist Party had designated 36 million people on the mainland as "landlords and rich peasants" to be made "the object of revolution".⁵⁷ These groups had suffered

54. Han, Saohua. "Reflection on Teacher's Selling Melons," *Renmin Ribao*, June 26, 1980, p. 8.

55. "No Delay Should Be Allowed in Developing Research in Agriculture," *Renmin Ribao*, May 7, 1978, p. 1.

56. "Why Are There So Few Who Speak for the Peasants," *Renmin Ribao*, October 19, 1980, p. 3.

57. Wu, Min, "The Number of Landlords and Peasants Is as Numerous as 36 Million," *Ming Pao Daily News*, May 22, 1981, p. 3.

innumerable persecutions, including violent deaths, for the past 30 years.

On the degree of "social homogenization" within each social stratum on mainland China, we know that there is a complicated system of ranks and wages and that the system of ranks is different in different professions.⁵⁸ Within the Party and government, for example, there are about 30 ranks. The differential between the highest and lowest levels, before 1956, was 28: 1 and, after 1956, to 25.2: 1.⁵⁹ The late Alexander Eckstein found, while on mainland China, that the range of wage differential in Chinese industry was from 3:1 to 5:1, and, in his words, "quite typical for industries in many other countries, both developed and underdeveloped."⁶⁰ But these formal differences are only part of the story. Conversation with former residents of mainland China revealed that an inequality more substantial than wages on mainland China was the existence of privileges for the higherups. The description of the privileges of high Party officials on mainland China by the editor of the *China News Analysis* is worthy of quoting:

The salary of a top man may be ten times that of the lowest grades, but in itself, particularly when compared with salaries in the Western world, it is not high. Nevertheless the higher cadres enjoy privileges, which are admired and envied by the lower cadres.

Fairly reliable sources say that in Canton the highest army and government officials of the present regime live now in the modern villas once occupied by the Nationalist high officials. The man in the highest brackets have cars at their disposal. Their entertainment expenses are met by the State, as are also their own and their families' medical expenses. Their wives do not go to the market, and if they go shopping, they do so in private cars with the car-curtains drawn.

Lines of distinction between the ranks are sharply drawn. A section has several cars and its leaders may use one when on an official errand; on trains they travel hard-berth; for lodging each has a flat with two bedrooms and a sitting room.

58. "Ranks and Wages," *China News Analysis*, 1974 (1966), pp. 1-7.

59. Whyte, Martin Kong, "Inequality and Stratification in China," *The China Quarterly*, 1975 (64), pp. 684-711.

60. Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution*, p. 299.

The head of a Department lives in a house with 3 bedrooms and a sitting room. He has a car at his personal disposal, but only for official purposes. On trains he travels soft-berth. If necessary, he can travel by plane. When he or a member of his family is sick, the hospital gives the case preferential treatment.

The head of a Bureau has his own private car; all he has to pay for is the petrol. If he travels with some of his subordinates he can reserve a special coach on the train; and he may always travel by plane. He lives in a house with a garden, or, if no such house is available, in a flat with four bedrooms and sitting room. He has a special body-guard and a chauffeur and his family has a woman servant. The head of a province may have several bodyguards and servants, and he may travel on a special plane.⁶¹

More than the above-mentioned privileges tied to a Party cadres' formal position is the hereditary nature of these privileges. After the death of Mao, there has been an expose in the mainland Chinese media on the conduct and privileges of the children of high cadres. The latter has become a special class on the mainland.⁶² The children of Party cadres, especially high ranking ones, had followed special routes to position and privilege. In the late 1960s, children of high Party cadres avoided the "youth to the countryside" movement by entering the armed forces. Once inside the military, those privileged youngsters were given the least onerous and most civilian-related work such as positions in the logistic department and military hospitals. For a while, according to one source, seventy to eighty percent of the students in the major military medical colleges in Shanghai, Xian and Chongqing were sons and daughters of high Party cadres. When colleges and universities were revived in the early 1970s, the children of high Party cadres quickly left the armed forces and entered universities. By the late 1970s, children of Party cadres were given the first opportunity to go abroad to study in America and Europe.⁶³ Popular resentment against the privileged youngsters of the Communist officials on mainland China is re-

61. "Ranks and Wages," p. 6.

62. "Respectfully Caution Parents Not to Harm the Future of Your Children," *Renmin Ribao*, April 22, 1979, p. 3.

63. Mu, Min, "Going into Army-Entering College-Going Abroad," *Ch'ih Shih Nien-Tai* (The Seventies), 1979 (12), pp. 8-9; Wong, Jan, "China's Leap to American Campuses," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 15, 1981, pp. 82-100.

flected in the short stories, poems and essays that were published in 1978-79 and in the rise of a popular theory on the "class of bureaucrats" in China.⁶⁴

By all accounts, the most glaring inequality on mainland China is between life in the countryside and life in the cities. According to Martin Whyte, "in spite of the official policy of reducing the urban-rural income gap, a large differential remains, and it is not clear that it has been reduced to any extent since 1949".⁶⁵ Whyte suggested that the urban-rural differential in income is on the order of 2:1. However, according to the State Statistical Bureau, in 1980, the average income of a urban resident was \$319 whereas that of a rural resident was \$88, a differential of 3.6:1.⁶⁶ Nick Eberstadt further elaborated on the urban-rural differential:

The most surprising fact about the inequality between city and countryside in China is that there are no clear signs it is diminishing. It was about 2:1 not only in the 1950s but also in the 1930s, the era of impoverished peasants and grasping urban capitalists. Income inequality *within* cities or rural regions may have declined, but there is no evidence that nearly three decades of socialism have brought . . . "equality" between rural "peasants" and urban "workers."

Even greater than the difference between city and country, however, is the difference between rich and poor provinces. Partly by historical accident and partly by design, China's wealth lies along a coastal rim which extends up into Manchuria. . . . In 1957, the last year for which there are reliable and comprehensive figures, the ratio of per capita agricultural and industrial income between Honan, the poorest province, and Shanghai, the richest, was well over 7:1. . . .⁶⁷

Eberstadt's analysis has been confirmed by a 1981 official report which stated that ten percent of the 2,000-odd counties on mainland China have experienced no improvement in life since the 1950s.

64. Li, Yi. "The Reality of China as Reflected in New Literary Works," *Ch'ih Shih Nien-tai* (The Seventies), 1980 (6), pp. 28-33; "On 'Opposition to the Bureaucratic Class,'" *Renmin Ribao*, February 11, 1981, p. 4.

65. Whyte, "Inequality and Stratification in China," p. 686.

66. "State Statistical Bureau Releases Figures," *Ming Pao Daily News*, October 4, 1981, p. 1.

67. Eberstadt, Nick. "China: How Much Success?" *The New York Review of Books*, 1979, XXVI (7), p. 40.

These counties are located in the northwest and southwest frontier regions. Economically, counties leading the nation are in the Songhua-Liao valley in the northeast, on the Changjiang (Yangtze) delta and the Hangzhou-Jianxing-Huzhou plain in the east, and on the Zhugjiang (Pearl) River delta in the South. In 1979, of the 1,622 outstanding production brigades (about 2.3 percent of the total in the country) whose per capita income was \$210, 400 were on the periphery of Shanghai.⁶⁸ So, the image of mainland China being a dual society, one urban and one rural, is once more reinforced.

In sum, we cannot say categorically that Inkeles' "social homogenization" has taken place on mainland China from 1949 to 1980. We see little change in urban-rural differential from the 1930s to the present. Though the formal wage system on mainland China does not show extreme disparity, there is a vast difference between the high and the low in privileges.

The political stratification of mainland China also shows little tendency toward homogenization in the access to power. The activities of the Cultural Revolution bear this out. Mao Zedong had originally induced a large number of youngsters to support his Cultural Revolution with a vague promise of more access to power. In the end, the Cultural Revolution had merely replaced one group of veteran Party cadres with another. That is why to this day the phenomenon of "aging" among Party leadership at every level of bureaucracy remains a national issue.

As to Inkeles' concept of social equilibration which referred to the consistency in an individual's rank in several stratification subsystems, we do not have much information pertaining to mainland China. According to Inkeles, "the educational measure is particularly useful in highlighting the tendency of modern society to bring the different stratification measures 'into line.'"⁶⁹ However, on mainland China, before 1976, Mao took several measures to cancel the equilibrating effect of education, such as sending educated youth to settle permanently in the countryside, stressing "Politics taking command," or "amateurs leading experts," etc. Mao's leftwing disciples actually prevented educated parents from passing their education to their children. Arthur Galston, not a critic of Communist Party, nevertheless observed:

Conversations with several professional people re-

68. *Our Commentator*, "Let Some Localities and Peasants Prosper First," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (3), pp. 19-22.

69. Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, p. 147.

vealed that their sons or daughters rarely followed in the parents' footsteps; most become farmers, laborers, or volunteers in advanced project work in the People's Liberation Army. Repeatedly I asked my hosts if this were a studied governmental policy to preclude an unbroken line of educational opportunities within any one family. Most denied that there could be such a policy, but the consistency of the pattern leads me to think otherwise.⁷⁰

Impressionistic evidence suggests that mainland Chinese must possess two crucial assets to enable them to draw their rank in another stratification subsystem (e.g., power, income, status, style of life, etc.) into line. They are: membership in the Communist Party and urban residence. A former resident of mainland China explained to an American scholar the reasons for the people's desire to move to Shanghai:

They come mainly for material benefit. A worker is usually paid higher wages in Shanghai than in other cities, not to mention the rural areas. And in Shanghai he can enjoy the facilities of China's most modern city. There he will have more rationed food, cooking oil, and sugar. He can buy a greater variety of commodities than is available even in Peking. And because Shanghai is more developed in all respects, the people enjoy more freedom of ideology, so to speak. Even the meetings in hours after work are fewer than elsewhere.⁷¹

The criticality of urban residence in having access to scarce goods in society is shown again in a press report on students taking the entrance examination for the Central Institute of Music in Peking in 1978. The report commented that most qualified and talented youngsters in recitals came predominantly from cities like Shanghai, Qingdao and Shengyang.⁷² The point is that, at least before 1976, education or modern knowledge did not play an important role in obtaining a person access to urban residence or Party membership. Rather, ascriptive factors such as family connections or class background determined Party membership or urban residence. However, in certain selected areas, not even Mao could stop the equilibrating

70. Galston, Arthur W. with Jean S. Savage, *Daily Life in People's China* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1975), pp. 212-213.

71. White III, Lynn T, *Careers in Shanghai* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 210.

72. Li, Lin, "New Flowers Blooming," *Renmin Ribao*, February 8, 1978, p. 3.

effects of modern education and occupation. These are the defense-related subjects such as nuclear physics, computer science, and space science. To these lucky few (many of the young ones in these fields are children of high Party cadres) social equilibration is real. But for the vast majority of the people on mainland China, their rank in each stratification system has very little "carry-over" effect on other systems. Mainland Chinese society is in fact highly segregated and traditional. In traditional society, said Inkeles, "there is relatively sharp separation between many of the different stratification realms, because of religious and quasi-religious restrictions on certain types of activity".⁷³ Former residents of mainland China bear witness to the existence of political restrictions on the people's choice of career and profession.

It should surprise no one that social mobility on mainland China is subject to the influence of those broad events that we have already mentioned: the gap between the city and countryside, destruction of the educational system during 1966-1976, the norm of "Politics taking command," and the priority in heavy industry. In retrospect, social mobility on mainland China was relatively high in 1950-57. For example, in the period of 1949-59, the number of students in higher educational institutes increased from 117,000 to 812,000 and the students in specialized vocational schools increased from 229,000 to 1,490,000.⁷⁴ In the same period Chinese industrial production grew at an annual rate of 18 percent. Moreover, during this period of the first Five-year Plan, the government invested significantly in interior China in order to even the spread of industry in China. According to Charles Roll, Jr., and Kung-chia Yeh, during 1953-57, more than two-thirds of the 694 major projects were designated to be located in the interior and the investment in the inland area accounted for 55 percent of the total.⁷⁵ These new industries in the inland areas of mainland China must have given a significant number of people a rare opportunity to advance socially. But by 1959, Chinese Communist state investment had shifted back to the coastal areas. By the 1970s both in population distribution and industrial output, the old imbalance between coastal and inland areas

73. Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, p. 145.

74. Li and Xu, "Educational Growth Must Be Kept Up With Growth in Economic Construction."

75. Roll, Charles Robert and Yeh, Kung-chia, *Balance in Coastal and Inland Industrial Development in the People's Republic of China* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1975), pp. 7-8.

remained virtually unchanged from 1949.⁷⁶

After 1959, several factors emerged to lower social mobility on mainland China: a rise in population, the destruction of the educational system, the imposition of stringent political criteria in daily life and the forced migration of millions of people from the cities to the countryside. Nationalization of commerce, service industry and handicraft which occurred before 1959 also tended to restrict social mobility for the people affected. By 1965, according to Michel Oksenberg, the social mobility on Chinese mainland was characterized by: (1) an extremely limited range of career choices, (2) intense competition and the involvement of risks and dangers, (3) career options usually limited in an organization, and (4) permanent exclusion from the political system if, for one reason or another, one did not accept the first offer or career by the system.⁷⁷ The Cultural Revolution, by destroying the higher educational system and paralyzing industry, depressed social mobility as a whole.

Today, career opportunity for Chinese youth is as limited as ever. Even those lucky enough to be in colleges or universities changing one's initial choice of study is very difficult, if not impossible.⁷⁸ To the majority of peasant youth, social mobility continues to mean what it has always meant since ancient time: to join the army. Unemployment in large cities has reached such an extent that when a district sanitation office in Shanghai wanted to hire 26 female sanitation workers (considered very low in employment status) in 1981, eight hundred high school graduates *within the district* applied.⁷⁹ It has been reported that the unemployed in urban areas in 1980 was 26 million.⁸⁰ It is estimated that from 1981 to 1985, 30 million youth would have to be given employment.⁸¹ There is no doubt that lack of career opportunity ranks the number one social problem on mainland China today and is one of the most important causes of the "crisis of faith in Socialism" in Communist China.

When we turn to social homogenization and stratification on

76. *Ibid.*

77. Oksenberg, Michel, "The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, 1968 (36), pp. 61-92.

78. "Yang Chengning on Education on the Mainland," *Ming Pao Daily News*, January 18, 1982, p. 2.

79. "One Out of Hundred," *Renmin Ribao*, August 27, 1981, p. 1.

80. "Unemployment on the Mainland," *Ming Pao Daily News*, February 16, 1981, p. 1.

81. Zhuang, Qitong and Sung, Keliang, "Urban Employment During the Period of Adjustment," *Hongqi*, 1981 (11), pp. 28-32.

Taiwan, the picture is radically different from the one on mainland China. A major difference pertains to the availability of reliable social statistics which is relatively abundant on Taiwan but scarce on mainland China. Because of the availability of data, it is possible for scholars to measure Taiwan's social development more exactly than mainland China's.

Data on Taiwan's income distribution over the past three decades show unmistakably that social homogenization has taken place. That is, there has been a reduction of the gap or range separating the top and the bottom of the scale in stratification systems. The most authoritative study on the case of Taiwan is by John Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo under the sponsorship of The World Bank. The title of their book is instructive: *Growth with Equity* (1979). According to these three scholars, most economists specializing in less developed nations are pessimistic about the simultaneity of economic growth and social equity, regarding the two as a trade-off. But the record of Taiwan is "deviant" from the general trend because Taiwan has been able to achieve both growth and equity. Fei, Ranis and Kuo used the Gini coefficient, a mathematical formula that shows how far from perfect a country's distribution of income is, to measure the equity of income distribution in Taiwan and reported:

In 1953 the Gini coefficient was 0.56, which is comparable to patterns of income distribution now prevailing in Brazil and Mexico. By 1964 the Gini coefficient dropped to 0.33, a level comparable to that of the best performers anywhere. This substantial decline in overall FID [Family Income Distribution] during the 1950s can be traced primarily to the rapidly improving rural FID, . . . and secondarily to the distribution of nonagricultural income, which probably did not worsen and may even have slightly improved.⁸²

A subsequent study by Shirley Kuo showed that the Gini coefficient of the family income distribution on Taiwan further declined from 0.33 in 1964 to 0.30 in 1972. The ratio of the income share of top 10 percent to that of bottom 10 percent declined from 8.63 in 1964 to 6.83 in 1972.⁸³ In 1953, the ratio of the top 10 to the bottom 10

82. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, *Growth with Equity*: TTC, pp. 65-66.

83. Kuo, Shirley Wang-yong, *Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area—Changes and Causes* (Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, Volume 1, 1975) in Charles H.C. Kao and Ben-chieh Liu, *Socioeconomic Development in Taiwan: An Analysis of Its Quality of Life Advancement* (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Eco-

Table 2: Wage of Workers in Selected Industries on Taiwan, 1980

Industry	Average Monthly Wage in U.S.\$	Percentage Increase over 1976
Electricity, Gas & Water	381	100
Mining & Quarrying	391	92.3
Transport & Communication	269	79.34
Manufacturing	245	97.75
Construction	224	73.12
Restaurants, Hotels*	134	32

* 1979 figures

Source: *Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China*, No. 180, December, 1980, pp. 117-118.

percent was 30.40.⁸⁴

Some differentials between urban and rural families exist on Taiwan but in no sense as extreme as the differential on mainland China. In 1980, for example, the average annual income of a farm family on Taiwan was 79.7 percent of a non-farm family and in 1981 the percentage had increased to 81.6.⁸⁵ According to one scholar, writing in 1975, the wage level of over one million workers has not kept pace with Taiwan's economic progress. The average worker then made less than U.S. \$100 a month.⁸⁶ By 1980, however, a substantial rise in worker's wages had occurred. Table 2 illustrates the change in workers' wages. Moreover, about 38 percent of the labor force on Taiwan is insured and of these, 69 percent are industrial workers. Nevertheless, the power of labor unions is limited as strike is forbidden under Taiwan's Martial Law. A 1975 report states that the relationship between employees and employers is still colored by "feudalism." A proposal by several labor leaders in the 1970s for transferring bonus into share-holding met with stiff resistance from most industrialists.⁸⁷

conomic Development in Taiwan, The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, December 18-20, 1981), p. 5.

84. Fei, Ranis, and Keuo, *Growth with Equity: TTC*, pp. 65-66.

85. *Central Daily News*, September 20, 1981, p. 1.

86. Tien, Hung-Mao, "Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political Change," *The China Quarterly*, 1975 (64), pp. 615-644.

87. Wang, Hsiao-ch'ang. "Labor Union for the Past 30 Years." *Tai Wan Kuan-fu San-shih Nien*, Volume 3 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Provincial Government, 1975), pp. 178-179.

Table 3: Educational Background of Head of Household and Income on Taiwan (1977)

<u>Education of Head of Household</u>	<u>Average Available Income (Yearly)</u>
Graduate School	U.S. \$6708
University	4982
Junior College	4335
High School	3808
Junior Middle School	3556
Primary School	3080
Supplementary School or Illiterate	2518

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1978*. Taipei: Director General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1978, p. 358.

On Inkeles' measure of social equilibration, i.e., consistency over several subsystems of stratification, general information showed that Taiwan conforms to the "Western model." In other words, an individual's education tends to associate positively with his rank in other social hierarchies. This is dramatically shown in the 1977 income per household by educational level in Table 3. The largest number of heads of households with graduate school education is in the category of "Social Association and Individual Service" which refers to independent professions such as physicians, lawyers, accountants, etc.

Social mobility on Taiwan must have been relatively high, particularly among the young who originally come from the countryside. According to Fei, Ranis and Kuo,

By about 1968 the rapid pace of labor reallocation had led to the end of labor surplus and the beginning of labor scarcity. The rapid rise in real wages of unskilled workers, most closely proxied by the wage series for female textile workers, indicates this transition.⁸⁸

The high rate of mobility can also be seen in Table 4 on the changing composition of employment on Taiwan. Particularly noteworthy is the reduction of female farm workers and the increase in female employment in manufacturing and commerce. In 1981, the rate of

88. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, *Growth with Equity: TTC*, p. 32.

Table 4: Proportions of Employed People by Industry and Sex on Taiwan

	<u>1944</u>		<u>1977</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Agriculture	63.39	71.78	31.77	38.17
Mining	1.47	0.45	0.96	0.33
Manufacturing	7.56	2.38	18.55	28.44
Construction	0	0	4.60	0.84
Electricity, Gas & Water	0	0	0.79	0.26
Commerce	9.55	3.24	9.64	11.25
Transport	2.18	0.35	6.20	1.95
Service	12.30	17.52	27.46	18.75
Others	3.57	4.29	0.03	0.01

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1978* (Taipei: Director General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1978), pp. 20-21.

Note: The author has converted the raw scores into percentages.

unemployment on Taiwan was 1.69 percent, lower than the rate in the United States, Japan, West Germany, South Korea and England.⁸⁹ A study on the social mobility on Taiwan by Charlotte Wang who used the household survey data gathered by Wolfgang Grichting in 1970 found that:

there is more equality in the social mobility process in Taiwan than other countries, considering the levels of industrialization. The direct influence of [a] father's status on [his] son's occupational status is very weak in Taiwan. A large part of [a] father's influence on [his] son's status works through son's education. That is, [a] father's status affects

89. Far East Times, January 11, 1982, p. 7.

[his] son's educational attainment which in turn influences [his] son's occupational achievement. In fact, the data indicate that both the effect of [a] father's status on [his] son's education and the effect of [a] son's education on [a] son's occupation are relatively high in Taiwan.⁹⁰

Table 4 Wang concluded that the process of social mobility on Taiwan was similar to the United States.

There are, however, two qualifications to make about social mobility in Taiwan. First, most of the workers in manufacturing and other new industries are still relatively unskilled and have only junior middle school education. Because of that there is a limit to further mobility. Second, to those at the upper echelon of the socioeconomic-status, such as college graduates, a major problem is misemployment, i.e., a mismatch between the qualification of a person and his (her) job. In 1975, two Chinese professors had surveyed 2836 college graduates and found that only six out of ten college graduates indicated a satisfactory match between their training and their work.⁹¹ A youth survey by the provincial Taiwan government in 1981 found once more that unsatisfactory matching of one's education and employment was a primary complaint among the youth between the ages 13 to 20.⁹²

Judging by all indications Taiwan is on the threshold of another "industrial revolution" in which high skill workers are needed to make sophisticated products so to catch up with mature industrial nations and keep ahead of other rapidly developing nations such as South Korea.

(4) *Status of Women*

Modernization everywhere subverts some major old social relationships, depriving the latter of their traditional "sacredness." One of the major social relationships being eroded is the male domination of the female. Modernization with its advanced technology strikes at the root of male domination by making physical labor increasingly unnecessary. Education is the principal vehicle for the emancipation of women, making professional, managerial and cleri-

90. Wang, Charlotte Shiang-yun, "Social Mobility in Taiwan," in James S. Hsiung, ed., *The Taiwan Experience, 1950-1980* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 256.

91. Kao, Hsi-chun and Hsu, Yu-chu. "An Analysis of the Use of the Skill of Current College Graduates," in Yang Kuo-chu and Yeh, Ch'i-cheng, ed., *Tang Chien Tai Wan Shih Hui Wen Ti* (Taipei: Chu-liu Publishing Company, 1979), p. 100.

92. *Far East Times*, September 25, 1981, p. 5.

cal occupation available to them.⁹³

How, then, have the women on mainland China and Taiwan fared since 1949? Interestingly, the status of women is perhaps the one social relationship in which the contrast between mainland China and Taiwan is less sharp than in other areas of social development. The main difference between the two societies in the status of women lies in the urban-rural gap, which is so much wider on the mainland than on Taiwan. We shall briefly look at women's access to education, employment and political power.

According to a mainland Chinese writer, before 1949, women constituted at most one-fourth of primary school, one-fifth of middle school and 17.8 percent of college enrollment. Now, female enrollment at primary schools is less than half of the total enrollment. At middle schools, female enrollment is 40 percent of total and at colleges and universities, one-fourth of all the students are female. Before 1949, the percentage of female in total employees and workers was 7.5 and the ratio of male to female workers was 12:1. By 1980, the total number of female employees and workers has increased from 600,000 to 30 million and in textile industry, public health and arts and crafts, the number of female employees and workers exceeded more than half of all workers. Even with that impressive increase in female employment, the total number of female employees and workers is still one-half of male employees and workers. In primary and middle schools, female teachers constitute half of all the teachers. But at the university level, female instructors and professors are 26 percent of total university faculty.⁹⁴ The destruction of higher learning in the Cultural Revolution is definitely detrimental to the status of women. As Phyllis Andors found, the highly trained female specialists in mainland Chinese industry, education, medicine, and the cultural media before 1965 were a product of the educational system of the 1950s and early 1960s.⁹⁵

In terms of access to political power, according to the head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, there are 4.7 million female cadres, constituting 26 percent of total cadres which represent a 13 times increase over 1951. But among "leading cadres," the percentage of female

93. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 22.

94. Wu, Cangping, "Control the Growth of Population and A Further Emancipation of Women," *Renmin Ribao*, January 20, 1981, p. 5.

95. Andors, Phyllis, "Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of Women, 1960-1966," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*. 1976, II (1), pp. 89-119.

cadres is from 3 to 6 percent.⁹⁶

The above discussion, however, does not reveal the tremendous difference in the fate of women between those in cities and those in the countryside. Phyllis Andors, for example, pointed out that a whole range of institutional order in the countryside of mainland China does not provide conditions for "women's liberation," e.g., the overwhelming importance of physical strength in work, the work-point-allocation system, the lack of childcare or other services to relieve women of domestic duties, the absence of technological development to enable women to use their talent, and, above all, the equivocation of Communist authorities over the role of women in society.⁹⁷ Reports from mainland China since the death of Mao frequently mention traditional abuses of women in the countryside. For example, because of numerous incidents of marriage frauds in the countryside in which peasants use their daughters to make prospective husbands pay a large sum of money or give generous dowry and afterwards quickly sue for divorce so that their daughters can be used again, the paper *China Youth News* published a special column on "Marriage by Sale" in November 1978 and within three months, the paper received more than 4,000 letters from readers.⁹⁸

The 1981 year-end issue of the journal *Women of China* reports that kidnapping of countryside girls and their sale elsewhere are still being practiced.⁹⁹ The official *Beijing Review* reported in 1981 that: "Many young people below 30 did not even know that there was a marriage law in China."¹⁰⁰ The new rural policy of "contract farming" under the current administration on mainland China caused the farmers to withdraw their daughters from schools since from now on family income is based more on family than on collective labor. It is clear that the status of rural women on mainland China will "get worse before it gets better."

The women on Taiwan have scored impressive achievements in education for the past 30 years. Data in Table 5 shows that the access to education at all levels by the female population on Taiwan had increased tremendously since 1950. Up to middle school, apparently, women on Taiwan suffer no disadvantage since the rate of en-

96. *Renmin Ribao*, March 4, 1981, p. 2.

97. Andors, "Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of Women, 1960-1966", pp. 89-119.

98. *Renmin Ribao*, February 13, 1979, p. 4.

99. *Ming Pao Daily News*, December 18, 1981, p. 3.

100. "Implementation of New Marriage Law," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (3), pp. 7-8.

Table 5: Enrollment Rates by School-age Population Group on Taiwan

Year	6-11 Years* (1st Level)		12-17 Years (2nd Level)		18-24 Years (3rd Level)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1953	93.13	74.10	19.5	8.2	1.7	0.2
1977	99.60	99.54	77.5	71.3	11.8	7.8

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1978*. Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of China, p. 421.

* The data on the 6-11 years group are from: *Educational Statistics of the Republic of China*. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1978, p. 28.

rollment is the same as males. Though the rate of female enrollment in college is lower than males, the former increases at a much faster rate than the latter. A more interesting fact is that in 1977-78, 89.8 percent of female graduates from high schools moved on to college or university; the corresponding percentage for males is 68 percent.¹⁰¹ In 1977, in public universities and colleges on Taiwan (usually of higher quality than private colleges), female students constituted 36 percent. It is clear that a young Chinese woman has a much better chance to receive a modern education at any level on Taiwan than on mainland China.

We have shown earlier that female employment on Taiwan has risen significantly in the last 30 years, particularly in manufacturing and commercial establishment. A critical study of the status of women on Taiwan by Norma Diamond in the early 1970s stated that women employees tended to cluster in the low-skilled industrial jobs and in short-term service occupations. Actually as Table 4 shows, the increase in female employment since the 1960s was more in commerce than in service occupations. Professor Diamond also wrote that few women on Taiwan appeared in the prestigious professions such as medicine, law, engineering and university teaching and that "at most they are 8% of that upper segment of the work force although many are educationally qualified."¹⁰² The picture that Professor Diamond presents about the status of women on Taiwan is

101. *Educational Statistics of the Republic of China* (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1978), pp. 28-30.

102. Diamond, Norma, "The Status of Women in Taiwan: One Step Forward, Two

similar to the status of women in the United States or any industrial nation today.

With regard to women's access to political power on Taiwan, impressionistic evidence suggests that "tokenism" is the rule. This is not surprising, given the cultural norms that both the Nationalist government and the public subscribe to on Taiwan. The instances of women participating in organized activities are few. In 1975, among the 650,259 female adults residing in the city of Taipei, only 1.13 percent held membership in the city's Women Association.¹⁰³ Of course, low participation in formal organizations does not necessarily mean that the women on Taiwan are not interested in gaining more political power. Most likely low participation in organized activities reflects women's perception that there is little or no meaningful vehicle for participation at present.

(5) *Public Health*

In addition to the rise in literacy, equality, social mobility and the status of women, modernization greatly improves the health of the people as a result of modern medicine. The development of public health among nations again manifests Lerner's dichotomy of the "historical process" versus the "stochastic factor." The Western model, which follows a historical process, shows that improvement in the health of the people takes place after other modernization measures such as rise in food production and income of the population, increase in urbanization and availability of adequate housing and, most important of all, rise in the educational attainment of the population have already existed. But in many less developed nations today, Western missionaries, colonial officials and new nationalist leaders, have quickly introduced modern medicine without the accompaniment of modernization. As a result, population has risen without adequate food supply and other conditions of life. People under this type of artificial "modernization" are vulnerable to mass starvation or widespread malnutrition. The development of public health on Taiwan and mainland China again shows a contrast, with Taiwan following the Western model of historical process and mainland China, the path of "stochastic factor."

In public health as in economic development Taiwan has made

Steps Back," in Marilyn B. Young, ed., *Women in China* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1973), p. 214.

103. Chien, Chien-ch'iu, "Women's Activities for the Past 30 Years." *Tai Wan Kuan-fu San-shih Nien*, Volume 3 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Provincial Government, 1975), p. 270.

the transition from a traditional to a modern industrial society. Taiwan has accomplished this due to the Nationalist government's strategy of improving the conditions of life on Taiwan first. Table 6 shows the vast progress that Taiwan has made in those areas that have had an immediate impact on the health of the people.

Table 6: Health Related Indicators, Taiwan, 1952-80

	<u>1952-54</u>	<u>1980</u>
1. Daily calorie intake per capita	2,179	2,812
2. Daily calorie intake as percentage of requirement	93	120
3. Daily protein intake per capita (grams)	51.4	78.2
(a) Vegetable proteins	39.1	46.1
(b) Animal proteins	12.4	32.1
4. Percent private consumption expenditures on		
(a) Clothing	6.0	5.4
(b) Food	61.0	43.1
(c) Housing	13.5	22.1
(d) Health	2.8	4.8
(e) Transportation/Communication	1.4	5.0
(f) Education & cultural services	5.5	12.6
(g) Miscellaneous	6.4	7.0
5. Living space per head (square feet)	*	169
6. Percent population with access to piped water	28.2	68.0
7. Percent households with access to electric power	29.7	99.7
8. Per capita final electrical (k.w.h.)	15	431

* In 1965-69, the living space per head was 76 square feet.

Source: Paul K.C. Liu and Ching-lung Tsay. *Health, Population and Socioeconomic Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Economic Development in Taiwan, The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1981), p. 17.

Improvement of public health is not simply to make physicians

and medicine available but, more fundamentally, to raise the living standard of a society as a whole. Take, for example, the importance of housing, transportation and communication for the health of the public anywhere: a study on the child mortality in the midst of industrialization and urbanization found that number of rooms in the dwelling was related with remarkable consistency to child mortality. "Those with only one room had child mortality rates roughly two times that of those with 4 to 6 rooms."¹⁰⁴ On Taiwan, as a result of simultaneous improvement in life and medical services, the instances of infectious and parasitic diseases, influenza and pneumonia and bronchitis, common in less developed nations, declined dramatically. In the 1940s the proportions of deaths on Taiwan due to these diseases were around 40 percent. Then it declined to 20 percent in 1955 and to 5 percent in 1980.¹⁰⁵

In the meantime common diseases associated with modern and industrial societies rose on Taiwan. Mortality from cerebrovascular disease, malignant neoplasms, disease of heart and hypertension and accidents have ranked as the highest four leading causes of death on Taiwan since 1966. Liu and Tsay pointed out that this shift in the causes of death on Taiwan seems "too early in its stage of economic development".¹⁰⁶ They attribute it to: (1) the equality in distribution of income and consumption so that "health hazard from smoking, drinking and overfeeding are not limited to the higher occupational groups," and (2) the pollution of the environment due to rapid growth of industry.¹⁰⁷

There is also a degree of urban-rural disparity in the medical services on Taiwan. Some Chinese scholars have pointed out that people in the rural areas and remote villages have not received adequate medical attention. Decline in mortality from respiratory infection has benefited the urban resident more than rural people. Medical insurance has yet to be extended to the dependents of most civil servants. There is still no provision of free medical care for the aged and the poor.¹⁰⁸

104. Liu, Paul K.C. and Tsay, Ching-lung, *Health, Population and Socioeconomic Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Economic Development in Taiwan, the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, December 18-20, 1981), p. 20.

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

107. *Ibid.*

108. Kao, Charles H.C. and Liu, Ben-chieh, *Socioeconomic Development in Taiwan: An Analysis of Its Quality of Life Advancement* (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and

Much has been written about the state of public health on mainland China and sweeping claims have been made on behalf of the Communist Party. The government on mainland China publishes impressive statistics: hospital beds increased from 80,000 in 1949 to 1,982,000 in 1980; professional medical and health personnel, from 505,000 to 2,798,000. Smallpox is said to have been "wiped out." "Bubonic plague, venereal diseases, kala-azar, relapsing fever and typhus have *in the main* been eliminated" (emphasis added).¹⁰⁹ The Chinese Communist regime is said to have been particularly "successful" in bringing modern medicine to the countryside. Pi-chao Chen, for example, reported recently:

As of 1978, each of the more than 2,000 counties had its own general hospital, antiepidemic station, and maternal and child health hospital (MCH); virtually every one of China's communes has its own health center; and 80 percent of the nation's 750,000 production brigades have their own cooperative medical station manned by two or four barefoot doctors—one barefoot doctor for every 460 people in rural areas, . . . or 1.67 million barefoot doctors in all.¹¹⁰

However, one is not entirely certain whether Professor Chen is referring to a plan or an established fact. For, on December 24, 1979, the official *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) described the above system as a "draft regulation." Moreover, both Chen and the above press report pointed out that commune health system is to be based on "self-reliance," i.e., local finance. As a consequence the availability of medical care in the countryside of mainland China depends on the relative prosperity of a locality and the fortune of annual crops. In time of bad harvest, commune medical service has to be suspended.¹¹¹

Recent revelations from mainland Chinese press caution us not take some of the sweeping claims of the government at their face value. First, in the past much of the public health work in mainland China was carried out in the form of mass campaigns, such as cam-

Lessons of Economic Development in Taiwan, The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, December 18-20, 1981), p. 17.

109. "Medical and Health Work: Convincing Statistics," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (47) pp. 8-9.

110. Chen, Pi-chao, *Rural Health and Birth Planning in China* (North Carolina: International Fertility Research Program, Research Triangle Park, 1981), p. 20.

111. Lampton, David, "Performance and the Chinese Political System: A Preliminary Assessment of Education and Health Policies," *The China Quarterly*, 1978 (75), pp. 509-539.

paings to kill rats, flies, fleas, or schistosomiasis. Since campaigns were staged by the Party in a top-to-bottom manner, once the Party slackens its effort, there is little or no incentive for the people to undertake the same measures of public health. Thus in 1977-79, mainland Chinese press reported that relapses in public sanitation work had occurred. Most significantly, there was an urgent appeal by the government to combat schistosomiasis which was reported to have been wiped out a decade or so ago through a Maoist style of mass campaign.¹¹²

One can not find a better example of the transient effect of a "stochastic factor" like the sanitation campaigns on mainland China. Second, there are reports from mainland China that medical workers in preventive medicine have been demoralized and have changed their profession in large numbers.¹¹³

Third, there are increasing number of reports in Chinese Communist press on the need to pay attention to the "quality of population." Two demographers reported in 1980 that some 2,000 congenital diseases have been discovered. A health survey of 300,000 children under the age of seven in ten provinces found that "a relatively large proportion" of the children had birth defects such as heart disease, deformation and mental retardation. In some areas the instances of these diseases were on the rise.¹¹⁴ Another health survey conducted in 1978-80 found that 33 percent of a sample of 110,031 children below the age of 3 suffered from rickets. This sample was drawn from 21 provinces and cities on the mainland.¹¹⁵ These reports from mainland China should, at the very least, impress us that Chinese Communist leaders are only now beginning to find out the true state of public health on the mainland.

Then there are other health-related information from Chinese mainland that also suggests major defects in the health of the people. First, on the diet of the people on Chinese mainland, the per capita consumption of oil, sugar and meat in 1978, as compared with world average is as follows:

112. "Notice of the State Council on Launching Patriotic Sanitation Movement," *Renmin Ribao*, April 5, 1977, p. 1.

113. "Why Workers in Preventive Medicine Are Not Willing to Persist in Their Work," *Renmin Ribao*, February 23, 1980, p. 2.

114. Tian, Xueyuan and Liu, Zhaoxian, "Population, Four Modernizations and Investment in People," *Renmin Ribao*, July 22, 1980, p. 5.

115. *Ming Pao Daily News*, January 19, 1981, p. 3.

	<u>Mainland China</u>	<u>World</u>
Oil	3.85 lb./capita	33 lb.
Sugar	5.17	44
Meat	18.15	51.7

Source: *Renmin Ribao*, July 8, 1980, p.5.

In 1979, Li Xiannian, a deputy chairman of the Communist Party, stated that: "about 10 percent of China's 950 million people do not have enough to eat. Thousands of people are on relief, and factory workers now receive grain rations of only 31 pounds a month, not enough to sustain hard work".¹¹⁶ Second, on the living space of mainland Chinese, it was 3.6 square meters per person in 1978 whereas in 1954 the number was 4.5 square meters.¹¹⁷ Crowding and poor condition of buildings are frequently talked about by former residents of mainland China and now also in the mass media in China. This is a direct result of the official tactic of "production first, livelihood second." Finally, contrary to some early reports, there have been very serious environmental pollution and destruction on mainland China. It is reported that mainland China ranks among the worst in the nations of the world in pollution by sulphur dioxide.¹¹⁸ Pollution of river, destruction of forests and pastures and other forms of destruction of environment are extensive on mainland China.¹¹⁹

(6) *Media of Communication*

Modernization results in greatly expanded human associations and the receptivity of individuals to extra-familial cultural influences. Hence, almost everywhere urbanization and industrialization are accompanied by a rapid rise in the use of mass communication which, in turn, "contributes greatly to the integration of society and permits the maintenance of a close rapport among its many divergent elements".¹²⁰ However, in the development of mass media, two

116. Butterfield, Fox, "China's Modernization Said to Cause 1978 Deficit," *The New York Times*, June 15, 1979.

117. Zhou, Sulien and Lin, Shengmu, "On Housing," *Renmin Ribao*, August 5, 1980, p. 5.

118. Yi, Zhi, "Protecting the Environment and Benefiting the People," *Renmin Ribao*, November 10, 1980, p. 5.

119. Smil, Vaclav, "Environmental Degradation in China," *Asian Survey*, 1980, XX (8), pp. 777-788.

120. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 22.

divergent approaches have emerged among nations. One, the Western model, is based on mass media as a social and commercial agency. The other, the "Eastern" model, is based on the ideology of radical intellectuals in the less developed nations. According to the latter theory, mass media are to be used as a "socializing" agency of the government. The elites in less developed nations seek to "sanitize" mass media on the ground of opposing "capitalistic materialism." Ithiel Pool has pointed out that social-psychological considerations have cast doubt on the efficacy of the "sanitized" approach to mass communication.¹²¹ The Western model, through the advertising of goods and services, tapped the dynamic motivational force in the people, greatly facilitating economic growth. Pool's observation on the effect of commercial advertising in mass media is worth quoting:

The request for a particular purchase preference is only a small part of a plea in favor of a whole modernized way of life. Media which are committed to expanding the market for new products, new interests, and new enjoyments also portray new kinds of men in new kinds of environments. The entrepreneur, as Marx pointed out, is a revolutionist, although he may not intend to be. It is the mass media—traditionally the press, but now others too—which make what would otherwise be wistful dreams of a few modernizers into the dynamic aspirations of a whole people.¹²²

In reality, just as in our discussion of "crescive" versus "enacted" change, many nations have combined a commercial mass media with a certain extent of political "sanitization." It is in Communist nations that the most extreme "sanitization" of mass media take place.

Taiwan follows, to a large extent, the Western model, combined with some government regulations. By 1980, the mass media on Taiwan have met the qualifications of a modern society. According to Black,

Modern societies have annual newspaper circulations of 250 to 500 per 1,000 population, exchange each year 100 to 350 items of domestic mail per capita, own 250 to 950 radios and 50 to 300 television sets per 1,000 population, and

121. Pool, Ithiel de Sola, "The Role of Communication in the Process of Modernization and Technological Change," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, ed., *Industrialization and Society*, (Mouton: UNESCO, 1966), pp. 286-289.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

have an annual cinema attendance of 10 to 25 per capita. Traditional societies had none of these means of communication a century or more ago, and even today possess them in a limited degree.¹²³

On Taiwan there are 120 copies of newspaper, 200 or more radios and 203 television sets for every 1,000 people.¹²⁴ From 1960 to 1975, the advertizing revenue of the press on Taiwan rose 11 times, from \$2.8 million to \$29 million. In the same period, the proportions of television advertizing increased from 0.5 to 31.4 percent.¹²⁵ Apparently, the media on Taiwan have contributed to the rapid growth of Taiwan's economy.

Mainland China took the radical "sanitization" approach toward mass media which have been a Communist Party monopoly since 1950. Just as in other areas of socioeconomic development on mainland China, the development of mass media has been uneven. For example, in 1980 there are an average of seven copies of newspapers and nine television sets for every 1,000 population on mainland China.¹²⁶ It was reported that 3 billion movie tickets were sold in 1980, a mere three per person.¹²⁷ There are no estimates on the number of radios on mainland China. But since the 1950s a loudspeaker network had been established in the countryside. By 1975 there were 106 million loudspeakers in the countryside of mainland China, or 132.5 loudspeakers for every 1,000 Chinese peasants. Obviously, the rapid increase of loudspeakers is a result of administrative decision, not an outgrowth of modernization in the countryside. Because of that the loudspeaker system is poorly integrated with rural life. Not only have there been numerous complaints by peasants on the content of loudspeaker broadcasting but also the practice, apparently widespread, of sabotaging the speakers.¹²⁸

My own study of the loudspeaker system on mainland China shows that the Communist Party has had continuous difficulty in maintaining the network. So whenever there was urgent need to inform the peasants of important national policies, a new drive had to

123. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 22.

124. *Central Daily News*, October 12, 1981, p. 1; Li, Chan, "The Mass Media in the Past 30 Years." *Tai Wan Kuan-fu San-shih Nien*. Volume 4 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Provincial Government, 1975), p. 187.

125. Li, "The Mass Media in the Past 30 Years."

126. Zhou, Zheng, "Newspapers in China," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (20), pp. 23-25; *Renmin Ribao*, August 14, 1981, p. 4.

127. *Ming Pao Daily News*, November 22, 1981, p. 1.

128. *Renmin Ribao*, October 27, 1979, p. 3, & September 2, 1981, p. 8.

be launched to repair and restore wired radios in the countryside; for example, movements to install wired radios in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1973.¹²⁹ Another indication of poor integration between media and society on mainland China is the failure of the Communist Party to establish a permanent "county press."¹³⁰ To use Mao's own words, culturally, the countryside of mainland China, remains "poor and blank" and can not sustain a complete mass media system.

It is significant that the post-Mao leadership on mainland China has "rehabilitated" advertising in the press. A special advertising paper known as *Sichang* (The Marketplace) has been published. But the Communist Party has balked at genuine "commercial advertising" that could fire the imagination of the people. Most of the advertisement in the mainland Chinese press is for "capital goods," not consumer goods.

In telecommunication, Taiwan also exceeds mainland China. In 1979, for example, there were 1,110 telephones for 10,000 populations on Taiwan whereas on mainland China, the corresponding number was 17.¹³¹ By the end of 1981, telephone exchanges on Taiwan were converted entirely to automated operation. On mainland China, the first telephone directory in ten years for the city of Peking was published in 1980, but it carried no private listings.¹³² A mainland Chinese press report of 1979 revealed that from 1949 to 1977, the total value of industrial output increased by 30 times, postal routes and long distance telephone lines by only seven times and intra-city telephone lines by five times.¹³³

The contrast in the volume of growth on mainland China between loudspeakers and telephones is instructive. The mainland pattern corresponds to the development of mass media and telephone in East European nations. Frey discovered that in East European countries, mass media are emphasized but mail and telephone are de-emphasized. As Frey put it: "One obvious hypothesis to explain this difference . . . is to assume that these nations wish to emphasize social control in their communications policy."¹³⁴ Moreover, like the

129. Liu, Alan P.L., *Communications and National Integration in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.

130. *Renmin Ribao*, September 2, 1981, p. 8.

131. Shih Hou, "Telephone Service in the Mainland Cities," *Chung Kung Yen Chiu* (Studies on Chinese Communism), 1980 (7), pp. 60-66.

132. *Ming Pao Daily News*, September 14, 1980, p. 1.

133. *Renmin Ribao*, May 25, 1979, p. 2.

134. Frey, Frederick W., "Communication and Development," in Athiel on Sola Pool and Wilbur Schramm, ed., *Handbook of Communication* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1973), p. 358.

mass media, the telephones on mainland China have also been "sanitized" by the Communist Party. Former residents of mainland China report that in the countryside phones are only installed in commune or brigade offices. In the cities, with some exceptions, phones are installed in the homes of trusted "activists." In principle, the public has access to the phones in the homes of activists but they must use the phones under the watchful eyes of activists.

(7) *Social Consensus and Integration*

The various aspects of social change that we have discussed so far are generally referred to in scholarly literature as "social mobilization." The changes in occupational composition, level of literacy and education, social stratification and mobility, status of women, public health and media of communication all result in breaking people away from traditional bondage and mobilizing them to be a part of a new society. Based on the experience of advanced industrial nations in the world, as social mobilization passes a crucial point, a new social consensus and integration develop. The crucial point that separates mobilization from integration is the proportion of population engaged in manufacturing and services as distinct from agriculture and other forms of primary production.¹³⁵ All other critical socioeconomic change such as literacy, educational attainment, urbanization, health and availability of mass media hinge on the shift from farm to non-farm occupations. When a society enters into the stage of integration, consensus both in political and social realm increases. Politically nationalism spreads among the people and, due to the process of mobilizing society, the power of national government over the population is enhanced. Socially, "there is also a much greater consensus than ever before among interest groups regarding the policies of modernization that should be followed."¹³⁶ Though there will always be differences and controversies in an integrated society, at least the range of controversy is greatly narrowed. It is clear that, based on the above discussion, Taiwan is a more integrated society than mainland China.

For more than 20 years, the Communist Party on mainland China had kept up a false front of consensus and integration which often misled naive foreign visitors to China. After the death of Mao, the facade of consensus and unity could no longer be maintained. Subsequently, people outside of China were treated to a rich fare of

135. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 82.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

self-criticisms by post-Mao leaders and mass protest by the people. Instead of integration we see a dual society on the mainland, one urban and the other, rural. In terms of socioeconomic development no significant modernization has taken place in the countryside though the national authority has penetrated the countryside through a local bureaucracy and a loudspeaker system. Otherwise traditional values still hold sway, e.g., superstition, old religious beliefs, patriarchal rule, oppression of women, illiteracy and, of course, poverty.

Social mobilization has been more advanced in the cities than in the countryside on mainland China. But there is little indication that consensus or integration has accompanied the rise in social mobilization. So the Western model of integration and consensus to follow from social mobilization is not borne out by the history of mainland China under Communist rule. C.E. Black, however, did mention an important "stochastic factor" in the process of mobilization-integration. That is the ideology and personality of political leaders. As Black puts it:

The circumstances under which modernizing leaders take power also cast a long shadow over the later development of a society. If the transfer of power from the traditional leaders is achieved with considerable bloodshed, it may lead to the glorification of violence for many generations.¹³⁷

The long and bloody road that the Chinese Communist Party took to national power has indeed led it to glorify violence and conflict. In their own way, the post-Mao Chinese Communist leaders have admitted to that. The "Resolution on Questions in Party History Since 1949" states:

Our Party had long existed in circumstances of war and fierce class struggle. It was not fully prepared either ideologically or in terms of scientific study, for the swift advent of the new-born socialist society . . . we were liable, owing to the historical circumstances in which our Party grew, to continue to regard issues unrelated to class struggle as its manifestations when observing and handling new contradictions and problems . . . And when confronted with actual class struggle under the new conditions, we habitually fell back on the familiar methods and experiences of the

137. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

large-scale, turbulent mass struggle of the past, which should no longer have been mechanically followed. . . .¹³⁸

As a consequence of Communist Party's practice of class struggle, mainland Chinese society today is rent by conflict, mutual distrust and suspicion. One recalls the statement by writer Ting Ling: "Between two friends, they speak truth. Between three, they exchange jokes. Between four, they tell lies".¹³⁹ One might argue that what Ting Ling describes was valid only in the period immediately after the Cultural Revolution. To a limited extent this argument is valid. That is, extreme social atomization exists only briefly following political terror. Social stability usually returns after a lapse of time. But one must also recognize that the Cultural Revolution is but a culmination of some twenty years of campaigns of class struggle and varying degrees of terror. Chinese social relation cannot but be affected by these campaigns. As one account has it:

The old friendly easy-going courtesy—shopkeepers and children in the streets chattering even with strangers—has given place to a polite restraint, a discreet veil covering the thoughts of the individual.¹⁴⁰

But the most forceful testimony on the high degree of mistrust among mainland Chinese comes from students from the mainland who are now studying on American campuses. While in America, the students from the mainland have met students from Taiwan. Repeatedly, mainland Chinese students have commented that students from Taiwan are "innocent" (*tien cheng*) and "compassionate" (*Je ch'in*), in contrast to the "guarded" (*hsiao hsin*) relationship between mainland Chinese students. One might argue that this contrast between the students from Taiwan and from mainland China is due to age difference, since the former are usually younger than the latter. But open discussion in the mainland Chinese press about their "youth problem" invalidates the argument attributing the lack of trust among mainland Chinese students to advancement in age.

Due to a combination of poverty, unemployment, disillusionment with the Communist system and the ethos of conflict, there is a prevailing "mean streak" on mainland China. Two press reports suffice to give some insights to this phenomenon. First, a soldier helped a passenger getting on a crowded bus, whereupon a group of

138. "On Questions of Party History," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (27), pp. 10-39.

139. Fang, Chi. "The Wintry Years of Ting Ling," *Ming Pao Daily News*, June 8, 1979, p. 3.

140. "Changes in Chinese Society, 1949-1969," *China News Analysis*, 1969 (774), p. 2.

youngsters shouted: "Hey, soldierboy! Are you about to be admitted to the Party? I bet you will be given cadre status."¹⁴¹

The second report involved the treatment of a "model worker." As soon as the young man in question was declared to be a "Long March Trailblazer," he was burdened with all sorts of chores by his co-workers and was forced to put up with constant taunts. Once the young model worker was away for two weeks, the garbage in his residence hall began to pile up in the open. His co-workers maintained: "Wait till he comes back to clean up. After all, he is the advanced one!"¹⁴² The mood of the youth on mainland China can be gauged by the way Wang Renchong, Director of the Propaganda Department of Party Central Committee, replied to his own rhetorical question in a speech celebrating the Youth Day on May 4, 1980:

A generation of meritorious youth is needed to shoulder our historical task. What kind of youth is this generation? Now, to answer this question there are many observations. A correct one is needed. In my opinion, it is not proper to give a simple answer to describe the spirit of this generation of youth as a whole. . . .¹⁴³

In response to the "mean streak" on mainland Chinese society, the Communist Party recently launched a nation-wide campaign of "Five Stresses and Four Points of Beauty: stress on decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morale; beauty of the mind, language, behavior and the environment."

It is sometimes maintained that after 30 years of continuous political indoctrination and mobilization, mainland Chinese must be highly nationalistic or at least politically aware. But there are indications that Chinese people are sated with propaganda and have grown indifferent to it. One long-time "China watcher" maintained:

There is nothing to prove that the intense nationalism of the leaders finds any echo in popular feeling. Organized mass demonstrations of national indignation start and stop with clockwork precision.¹⁴⁴

It is also said that as a result of sending urban youth to the countryside "young people today have a much better grasp of what China is like than the young had twenty years ago".¹⁴⁵ But national aware-

141. *Renmin Ribao*, February 23, 1981, p. 3.

142. *Ibid.*, February 13, 1981, p. 3.

143. *Ibid.*, May 5, 1980, p. 3.

144. "Changes in Chinese Society, 1949-1969.", p. 3.

145. *Ibid.*

ness does not necessarily create social consensus. On the contrary, the poverty and backwardness of the Chinese countryside on mainland China have horrified and disgusted most urban youth. Instead of enthusiasm to serve the countryside, disillusionment with the Communist system is the main result of the youth-to-the-countryside movement. Sociologists in the West have known that initial contact between two groups of radically different socioeconomic status often creates contempt on the part of the higher group for the lower group.

In sum, 30 years of social development on mainland China under the Communist rule has brought an extremely uneven social mobilization and a rise in conflict. To those who maintain that Mao Tse-tung had left behind a "dynamic society"¹⁴⁶ or "progress toward the development of a social ethic",¹⁴⁷ the words of Feng Wenbin, Vice President of the Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, ought to have a sobering effect:

The serious mistakes ["exaggerating the class struggle," "overanxious to transform the relations of production," "impatient for success in economic construction"] . . . and the 10 years of the "cultural revolution" in particular, brought our national economy to the brink of collapse. Incalculable losses in terms of political ideology, culture, education, social morality, etc. were sustained. What is particularly serious, the training and education of a whole generation was neglected. During the decade of the "cultural revolution," institutions of higher learning and secondary technical schools trained several million fewer professional people than they would have done. Spare-time cultural and scientific education of the workers and staff members hardly existed. Illiteracy increased. Social morality degenerated, superstitious activities revived, and many youths became confused ideologically and their mental outlook was affected adversely. All this has seriously hampered the building of our socialist material and intellectual civilization.¹⁴⁸

Taiwan, as measured by the objective indicators of social mobil-

146. Wang, James C.F., *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 58.

147. Townsend, James R., *Politics in China* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p. 327.

148. Feng, Wenbin, "Nature of Chinese Society Today," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (25), p. 21.

ization, has crossed over into social integration. Nevertheless, compared with mature industrial nations, Taiwan has just begun its integration phase. The agricultural population still constitutes 25 percent of the nation's employment structure. Taiwan has not yet become "an employee society." The preference of a substantial number of the gainfully employed is for independent operation, i.e., a strong residue of the days of "petty producers".¹⁴⁹ Hence, large scale corporations with high efficiency in management and production are slow to emerge on Taiwan.

Social integration on Taiwan is facilitated by the absence of any extreme divergence between urban and rural areas. Taiwan also has avoided a frontal clash between traditional ethos and modern values. Thus even as Taiwan's urbanization proceeded rapidly in 1960-1979, the number of religious temples increased simultaneously, from 3,835 in 1960 to 7,128 in 1979!¹⁵⁰

The most unique integration problem on Taiwan is, of course, the relationship between the native Taiwanese and the mainlanders. But even here is, *long-term* trends indicate consensus and integration. Studies on the value orientation of the students on Taiwan by Richard Wilson and Sheldon Appleton in the 1960s have borne this out. To quote Appleton's conclusion:

Despite the sometimes sharp economic and political inequalities noted between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, and a substantial tendency for students to mix socially within each of these groupings more often than across them, the students on Taiwan responded to the battery of questions put to them essentially as members of a single (unified, not fragmented) political culture. The differences between the Mainlander and Taiwanese groupings were in almost every respect amazingly small, even at the high school level. . . .¹⁵¹

But even amongst the grown-up, the *long-term* trend is toward consensus and integration. Hung-mao Tien, a Taiwanese political scientist, has this to say about the new middle class on Taiwan in 1974:

149. Lin, Jui-teh, "On the Quality of Taiwan's Population and Some Possible Solutions," in Yang, Kuo-chu and Yeh Ch'i-cheng, ed., *Tang Chien Tai Wan Shih Hui Wen Ti* (Taipei: Chu-liu Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 178-179.

150. Li, Yi-yuan, "On Religion and Superstition," in Yang Kuo-shu and Yeh Ch'i-cheng, ed., p. 139.

151. Appleton, Sheldon, "Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan: A Survey of Student Attitudes," *The China Quarterly*, 1970 (44), p. 56.

Taiwan has a growing middle class consisting mainly of merchants, a managerial elite, foreign traders, small industrial entrepreneurs, professionals and white-collar employees. Many have been financially very successful; some have acquired small and other large fortunes in their trade or enterprise adventures. These people share a strong preoccupation with material gain and the improvement of their living standards. Only a few seem particularly concerned with political participation and power. In the subtle manoeuvres of mutual backscratching with politicians and bureaucrats, businessmen and industrialists can usually gain access to the political arena. They are among the major beneficiaries of Taiwan's recent economic success. In their busy pursuit of economic advancement and material gain, they have come to appreciate the apparent socio-political stability of the country. It is fair to assume that most may incline to support the status quo or incremental change so long as their economic interests are being protected.¹⁵²

Professor Tien probably underestimated the political aspiration of the new middle class on Taiwan as the vigorous competition in recent local elections on Taiwan shows, but he is certainly correct in stressing the political moderation of the new middle class. What we are witnessing on Taiwan is a gradual development of a political "Center" which is to be expected of any society after a period of peaceful growth. The exact opposite of that had taken place on the Chinese mainland where the "Center" had long ago been destroyed by the Communist Party. That is one of the contributing causes of the 30 years of turmoil and conflict on the Chinese mainland.

In pointing out the long-term trend toward social consensus and integration on Taiwan, we do not imply that there is any inevitability in it. Examples from recent world history show that affluence does not directly lead to peace and tranquility and that, amidst a long trend of social integration and consensus, short-term regressions or reversals occur frequently. There is no doubt that the future of Taiwan's social integration hinges on its political development which is still trying to catch up with socioeconomic changes.

IV. EPILOGUE

We now come back to the initial question of this paper: What

152. Tien, "Taiwan In Transition: Prospects for Socio-political Change," p. 622.

does a radical revolution typically accomplish or fail to accomplish? The late Crane Brinton has made the following observation about the results of most revolutions:

1. Politically, a revolution ends the worst abuses and the worst inefficiencies of the old regime;
2. In every case, a revolution results in an improvement of the efficiency of government rather than individual freedom;
3. Initially, a degree of transfer of property by confiscation takes place;
4. The new ruling class after a revolution is an amalgamation of the old and new elite;
5. The effects of a revolution are the slightest in the social arrangements that most intimately and immediately touch the average men;
6. Revolutionary ideas have become a going concern and a factor in the stability of the post-revolution society;
7. Revolutions leave behind a tradition of successful revolt which serves as a spur to the discontented to go down the path of revolution again.¹⁵³

The Chinese Communist Party ended inflation and anarchy in the early 1950s, built an unprecedentedly powerful state structure on mainland China, crushed all real or potential dissenters and confiscated almost all land and private industry. The Chinese Communist Party, however, did not need to amalgamate itself with any part of the old elite on mainland China.

Writing in the late 1930s, Brinton was not able to take into account a new breed of revolutionary elites such as the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists who would revise some of Brinton's conclusions. These new "coercive ideologues"¹⁵⁴ in Asia came to national power after a protracted and extremely bloody armed rebellion. They had recruited their followers from the least modernized sector of society. Consequently, when these revolutionaries finally attained state power, they have not only had a very powerful civil-military machinery but they also had a close leader-follower relationship that was based on "primordial" sentiment. Therefore, Chinese Communists, unlike French or even Russian revolutionaries, did not need the help of any old elite. Chinese Communists did not have to wait long to start their "revolution from

153. Brinton, Crane, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

154. Lasswell, Harold D. and Lerner, Daniel, *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 456-468.

above." With a powerful civil-military force at their disposal, Chinese Communists and their disciples in Indochina forced their ideas on society with a degree of recklessness and ruthlessness rare in human history. The Chinese Communists thus surpassed the old regime in China in the efficiency of government and in the abuses of power. In 1957, during the "Hundred Flowers Blooming" campaign, a professor at the Central Nationality College stated bluntly and accurately: "the government today wished unprecedented power and also manifested unprecedented incompetence."¹⁵⁵ The consequence of that was not long in coming. In 1981, a noted mainland Chinese economist wrote in an economic journal that in 1959-1962, the number of "unnatural death" in China reached the figure of 10 million, in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.¹⁵⁶ The victims of the Cultural Revolution are reportedly to be at least five times those of the Great Leap.¹⁵⁷

Revolutionary ideas on mainland China have indeed become a going concern but the rub is that for two decades revolutionary ideas became the *only* concern of the Communist Party. Consequently the very survival of society is put in doubt. Far from being a factor in social stability, the revolutionary ideas of Mao had destructive social consequences. Ideology has contributed to the breakup of leadership. Brinton did not take into account the impact of participation in violence for a long period on the personality of revolutionaries.

The socioeconomic change on mainland China, in a general way, bears out Brinton's observation that revolutions have a very slight effect on intimate social relations of the average men. But the effect of political terror and political regimentation can be significant and long lasting if they are joined with the "natural" atomization of social relations that comes with rapid industrialization and urbanization. Brinton's assessment on the impotence of revolution in altering intimate social relationship is confirmed as far as social relations in the countryside of mainland China is concerned.

Another noteworthy point is that the Chinese Communist Party has had a worse record than the Soviet Union in mobilizing human

155. "Local Organizations of Association for Promoting Democracy Reap First Fruits of Anti-rightist Struggle," *Survey of China Mainland Press*, 1957 (1606), p. 25.

156. "Sun Yeh-fang Points to a Painful Lesson," *Ming Pao Daily News*, April 26, 1981, p. 1.

157. Butterfield, Fox, "Peking Indictment Accuses Radicals of Killing 34,000," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1980; Li, Kuo-Cheng, "Chinese Comments Reveal for the First Time the Statistics of 20 Million Deaths of the Cultural Revolution," *Ming Pao Daily News*, October 26, 1981, p. 3.

motivations. According to Inkeles, Soviet leaders initially showed a lack of sensitivity to the impact of their socioeconomic policy to human motivations and associations. As a result, Soviet leaders had to combat with apathy, lack of incentive, and consequent low productivity. But the 1940s and 1950s saw increasing success on the part of Soviet leaders to harness private motivations in support of formal institutions.¹⁵⁸ Judging from all indications, Mao's "model of development" is almost a total failure in tapping human motivations. As Zhao Ziyang said to the National People's Congress in November 1981:

We have immense labor power in the countryside and there is no need to worry about being short of people to do the work. The problem is, firstly, how to get them to do these things willingly and actively, . . .¹⁵⁹

Because of low morale and educational qualification of mainland Chinese workers, the Chinese Communist industrial system is wasteful, inefficient and a drain on national resources. Thus, revolutionaries create their own inefficiencies and abuses.

The contrast and contest in the socio-economic development between mainland China and Taiwan raises once more the fundamental question on the relative efficacy of revolution versus reform in altering the lifeway of a people. Reformers do not attract as much attention or interest from world's publicists as revolutionaries do. But by their steady exertion in numerous tasks, reformers such as those on Taiwan have proved that, given the right circumstance, they, not the Communist revolutionaries on the mainland, give real substance to the slogan which was originally coined on the mainland: *duo, kuai, hao*, and *sheng* (more, faster, better, economical). But even more important than "faster and better" is that reformers accomplish these results without having the population suffer what Levy calls "stupid death."

158. Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, p. 22.

159. Zhao, Ziyang, "The Present Economic Situation and the Principles for Future Economic Construction," *Beijing Review*, 1981 (51), p. 15.

